No strategic rift between Iran, Oman over Hormuz management
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
Over the past days, Iran objected to shipping arrangements and navigation routes announced in coordination with Oman but without Iranian involvement. Among them were the coordinates of two new temporary routes for vessel evacuation and traffic guidance proposed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in cooperation with Oman, which Tehran rejected. These developments have fueled speculation about possible disagreements between Tehran and Muscat over the management of the strategic waterway. However, Kamran Yeganegi told Iran Daily that Iran's primary concern is safeguarding its sovereign rights. Even if differences exist, they should be viewed as disagreements over "risk management" and "operational coordination" rather than evidence of a strategic divide between Tehran and Muscat.
IRAN DAILY: Does Iran's rejection shipping routes point to fundamental disagreements between Tehran and Muscat over the management and future of the Strait of Hormuz?
YEGANEGI: Not every technical or operational disagreement in the Strait of Hormuz should be interpreted as a strategic rift between Iran and Oman. Relations between Tehran and Muscat—particularly in mediation, crisis management, and regional dialogue—have a long and relatively stable track record. Therefore, in such a sensitive matter, it is important to distinguish between disagreement over the principle of cooperation and disagreement over coordinates, implementation methods, and safety guarantees.
Given the Strait of Hormuz's strategic importance, any temporary shipping route carries security and sovereignty implications for Iran and Oman. Therefore, opposition to a specific route does not necessarily equate to opposition to navigation, cooperation with Oman, or the IMO.
From Iran's perspective, the core issue is that no maritime transit mechanism in the Strait of Hormuz should be designed or implemented without considering the rights, concerns, and responsibilities of the coastal states. For Oman, maintaining maritime safety and preventing the crisis from escalating are key priorities. Therefore, if differences exist, they are better understood at the level of "risk management" and "operational coordination" rather than as clear signs of a strategic dispute between Tehran and Muscat.
Still, even technical disagreements can take on political significance during times of crisis. This is why the best path forward is to strengthen direct channels of dialogue among Iran, Oman, the IMO, and other relevant stakeholders.
How do Oman’s authority under international law in proposing or determining shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz intersect with Iran's sovereign rights in this strategic waterway?
Answering this question requires attention to a fundamental principle of the law of the sea: the governance of strategic waterways rests on a balance between the rights of coastal states and the security of international navigation. Neither principle can be sacrificed for the other.
As the two coastal states bordering the Strait of Hormuz, Iran and Oman both hold defined rights and responsibilities. Oman may propose technical shipping routes, but such proposals cannot override Iran's rights and jurisdiction in the waterway.
Likewise, The IMO is a technical body that develops standards and recommendations to enhance maritime safety. It facilitates coordination but lacks the authority to impose arrangements in sensitive waterways without the consent of the coastal states.
Iran’s legal position warrants particular attention. As one of the two coastal states bordering the Strait of Hormuz, it is not merely a user of the waterway but also holds sovereign rights within its jurisdiction and bears responsibility for maritime safety, security, and order.
It is therefore natural that, from Tehran's perspective, any alteration to shipping routes or any new maritime traffic management mechanism should be assessed with due regard for the rights, security concerns, and effective participation of the coastal states.
If differences do exist between Iran and Oman over maritime traffic management in the Strait of Hormuz, what impact could they have on regional security arrangements and the recent understanding between Tehran and Washington?
First and foremost, it is important to distinguish between two issues: keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to international navigation, and the specific mechanisms used to manage maritime traffic. A disagreement over the latter does not necessarily imply opposition to the former.
If Iran and Oman hold different views on certain traffic-management arrangements, and those differences are handled through dialogue and bilateral cooperation, they need not have strategic consequences for regional security. Over the past decades, Iran-Oman relations have been built on mutual trust, respect for sovereignty, and constructive engagement in managing regional crises. That political capital provides ample room for resolving technical or legal disagreements.
As for the recent understanding between Tehran and Washington, one of its objectives is to ensure maritime security and prevent disruptions to trade and energy flows. Achieving that goal requires implementation mechanisms that are consistent with international law and the legitimate rights of coastal states.
Therefore, if Iran raises concerns about routes or operational arrangements, this should not be interpreted as backtracking on the understanding or opposing the principle of keeping the Strait open. Rather, it can be seen as an exercise of Iran's legal rights and sovereign responsibilities as one of the two coastal states bordering this strategic waterway.
Under international law, maritime security and coastal-state sovereignty are complementary, not competing, principles. A sustainable framework for the Strait of Hormuz requires both safe navigation and respect for the rights, responsibilities, and security concerns of Iran and Oman.
Ultimately, the durability of any political understanding in the Strait of Hormuz depends less on the text of the agreement than on the quality of its implementation. The more implementation is based on consultation, mutual respect, and the active participation of coastal states—particularly Iran—the greater the chances of success. Ignoring the rights of coastal states, by contrast, could undermine any security arrangement.
What message does Tehran's opposition to some proposed routes send to the international community?
In my view, Tehran's opposition to certain proposed routes is less a rejection of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open than a legal and strategic message to the international community.
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