Israel’s goals in Lebanon extend beyond Hezbollah
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
Israel has intensified its military operations against Lebanon in recent days, expanding its ground offensive in southern Lebanon across Litani River. The escalation comes as the Lebanese government seeks to reach an agreement with Israel to halt hostilities through US-mediated talks. A ceasefire in Lebanon has also been among Iran's conditions in its negotiations with the United States. Speaking to Iran Daily, Mohammad Irani, an expert on Lebanese affairs, said Israel's objective is not merely to defeat Hezbollah. Rather, he argued, it is pursuing broader and longer-term goals, including the potential reoccupation of the Lebanese capital.
IRAN DAILY: By expanding its ground operations in southern Lebanon, what military and political objectives is Israel pursuing? Should these actions be viewed solely as pressure on Hezbollah, or are they part of a broader strategy?
IRANI: Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory has a long history. In fact, one could say that since the establishment of this regime, it has repeatedly harassed neighboring countries through aggressive actions beyond the borders it defined for itself. This is part of the very philosophy underpinning the Zionist regime.
Among Arab capitals, Beirut is unique in that it was occupied by Israeli forces once before, in 1982. What Israeli officials are now declaring goes beyond southern Lebanon. Under the three-phase plan they have outlined for achieving their objectives, the third phase effectively encompasses all of Lebanon and envisages an advance toward Beirut, including the reoccupation of the capital.
Looking at this regime's expansionist approach, both historically and today, it is true that its primary pressure is directed at the resistance, which remains the main obstacle to the expansion of Israeli aggression. At the same time, however, the regime and its military appear to be focused on broader and longer-term objectives. In reality, one could say that Lebanon's capital itself has become a target.
What impact will this escalation have on the negotiations currently taking place between Lebanon and Israel under US mediation? Should the intensification of military operations be seen as a sign of diplomatic failure or as part of the bargaining process toward a final agreement?
Israelis do not adhere to commitments or agreements. Wherever they have reached agreements, they have generally failed to uphold them as in deals with their other neighbors.
Take Jordan, for example. After signing the Wadi Araba Treaty in 1994, Jordanian officials later stated that it was never fully implemented. Jordan was supposed to receive half of the water from the Jordan River, yet that share was never actually delivered.
Likewise, with the Palestinians, despite the Oslo Accords being formally signed with American mediation, Israel was never willing to withdraw from the West Bank, not to mention the unresolved issue of East Jerusalem.
Today, the Lebanese government believes that through American mediation—and through pressure that Washington may exert on Israel—it can secure an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Yet there is no tangible evidence that this request is yielding any real or practical results. Although [US President Donald] Trump has promised to exert pressure on [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, in practice what we are witnessing is the opposite: the Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon has become more extensive than before.
Given that Tehran has consistently emphasized the link between the Lebanese conflict and wider regional developments, how will Israel's intensified operations in southern Lebanon affect Iran-US talks?
Any agreement reached with the Americans on ending hostilities across all fronts, including Lebanon, could materialize and may even be put on paper. However, I doubt the Israelis would abide by it.
Still, the Americans are fully aware that the Iranian negotiating team keeps Lebanon firmly in view. If any breakthrough is to occur, it can only happen within that framework. Otherwise, the Lebanese government is not likely to be able to persuade Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon, nor will it be able to convince—or compel—the Americans to force such a withdrawal.
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