US, Israel pursue no-war no-peace strategy on Iran
By Afifeh Abedi
International affairs expert
As the two-week ceasefire between Iran and the United States drew close to expiring, Pakistan’s efforts as a mediator to convene a new round of talks continued until the last moment, but Iran ultimately declined to take part in the negotiations. US President Donald Trump, despite earlier threats, announced that he had extended the ceasefire. He has, however, continued to refuse lifting the naval blockade, which Iran has declared a precondition for entering negotiations. In an interview with Iran Daily, Afifeh Abedi, an international affairs expert, argued that the current US-Israeli policy toward Iran amounts to a “no war, no peace” scenario, though one constrained by serious limitations. She believes Washington and Tel Aviv will ultimately be compelled either to accept a fair agreement with Iran or back away from both war and the region.
IRAN DAILY: How do you assess Iran’s decision not to attend the Islamabad talks? Was it driven by the alleged differences among senior Iranian officials, or by the lack of understanding between Iran and the United States over the terms of a possible agreement?
ABEDI: The continuation of hostile US positions and practical measures against Iran during the ceasefire and the first round of talks in Islamabad was a reminder of Washington’s repeated bad faith at the negotiating table. The US president’s positions indicate Washington is not seeking a fair agreement. The Trump administration, in trying to break the deadlock of war, is looking at the negotiating table for gains it failed to secure on the battlefield.
Beyond evidence suggesting the Trump administration remains captive to flawed calculations about Iran, developments on the ground also indicate that the United States and Israel are not in fact seeking an end to the war. Although both countries have faced serious constraints in their war against Iran, longstanding hostility and failure in war have pushed them toward a “no war, no peace” condition, through which they seek to advance hostile plans inside Iran and make up for the gaps created by the war.
How should Trump’s extension of the ceasefire, alongside his refusal to lift the naval blockade that Iran considers a precondition for negotiations, be interpreted?
Trump’s unilateral extension of the ceasefire does not amount to an American concession to Iran; rather, it reflects Washington’s serious constraints in reigniting war against Iran. If the United States believed it could achieve its goals through continuing the war, it would not hesitate for a moment. But it is now facing limitations. For that reason, despite claiming the ceasefire was extended in hopes of a second round of talks, Washington has not accepted Iran’s condition for returning to the table—namely, an end to the blockade.
The United States is planning for war, but at this juncture it has no more than three military options: 1. continuing the war in the form of the 40-day war, which so far has yielded no gains. 2. escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, a move carrying heavy consequences for both the US and global economy. 3. seizing the enriched material by force, something it has already attempted once and failed.
The ceasefire, therefore, has been extended with the blockade still in place so Washington can buy time and find a way out. But a prolonged blockade will carry growing economic consequences for both the United States and the world.
What are the main factors and variables that could break the current deadlock between Tehran and Washington?
At present, three major issues are on the table in Iran-US negotiations: Iran’s nuclear program, the future of the Strait of Hormuz, and compensation for damages caused by the unlawful US and Israeli war against Iran.
Iran’s proposals on a nuclear agreement, which had attracted international attention even before the war, including from Oman as mediator—as acknowledged by the Omani foreign minister and a British intelligence official—remain workable. On the Strait of Hormuz as well, beyond Iran’s sovereign rights, Tehran’s proposals are entirely fair.
As for compensation for the unjust damages caused by the United States and Britain, Iran has no interest in American money—funded either through US taxpayers or through the plunder of other nations. Given the strategic importance of securing the Strait, Iran has raised the issue of transit charges with two aims: contributing to regional security guarantees and compensating for war damages.
If the United States is genuinely seeking an agreement, it must accept Iran’s practical and ethical proposals, particularly as other countries have shown no opposition to them. But the problem remains the Trump administration’s flawed calculations and the extent to which it has been taken hostage by Israel and [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu.
If the naval blockade is not lifted and negotiations are not resumed, what are the most likely scenarios ahead?
A prolonged US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will not go unanswered by Iran, and that would mean intensified pressure on both the American and global economy. Under such conditions, the United States will come under pressure from its own allies, because the blockade has harmed—and will continue to harm—their economies.
But overall, the current option pursued by the United States and Israel appears to be “no war, no peace” against Iran. Yet this scenario itself faces significant constraints. Iran, having been under pressure for decades, will impose the reality of its power on the United States.
Washington will either have to reach a fair agreement with Iran, or quietly pull back from both the region and the war.