Strategic containment still ...
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The experience of the JCPOA showed that even when major European and Asian companies entered the Iranian market, Washington withdrew from the deal without paying a decisive economic cost. This suggests that in the hierarchy of decision-making in Washington, “strategic containment of Iran” takes priority over “economic gain.” Therefore, even if specific economic benefits are defined for American actors, there is no guarantee that at critical political moments these interests will outweigh security considerations, pressure from regional lobbies, or partisan rivalries.
Could including such economic issues ultimately pave the way for a comprehensive, durable and reliable agreement that leads to the effective and full lifting of sanctions on Iran, or will structural constraints in US policy continue to stand in the way?
Broad economic arrangements could, in theory, lead to a more sustainable deal. In the US case, however, the main obstacle is not the absence of economic design, but the multilayered sanctions structure and the instrumental use of the dollar and the global financial system. For Washington, sanctions are not merely a pressure tool; they are part of its financial and political architecture in the international system. For this reason, the “full and effective lifting of sanctions” is likely to face pushback from institutional actors, as sanctions provide a permanent source of leverage. Even if the sitting administration has the political will, Congress, security agencies and lobbying networks can prevent a deal from being fully institutionalized. As a result, the likelihood that a comprehensive agreement will lead to the durable and irreversible removal of sanctions remains limited within the current framework of US policy.
If an agreement is reached and sanctions are lifted, would American companies and economic actors realistically be able to benefit from these areas, or would political and legal barriers remain the main obstacle?
Even in the event of a deal, meaningful participation by American companies would be held back by deep political and legal constraints. US primary sanctions, which prohibit American citizens and firms from engaging with Iran, are largely rooted in congressional legislation, and their removal would require a complex and politically costly process. In addition, the risk of sanctions’ reimposition would discourage long-term investment. The period after the JCPOA showed that even non-US firms pulled back out of fear of secondary penalties. Structural barriers are therefore such that even if an agreement is reached, US economic engagement would remain fragile, limited and dependent on the country’s domestic political climate.
How should Takht-Ravanchi’s remarks be interpreted? Do they primarily reflect the Islamic Republic’s red lines and principled positions, or do they signal a more realistic understanding by the US of Iran’s nuclear program?
Takht-Ravanchi’s statement that “zero enrichment” is off the table should primarily be seen as the consolidation of a sovereign red line. The position is a response to a years-long US strategy aimed at steering negotiations toward the maximum restriction of Iran’s technical capabilities. From an analytical standpoint, it does not signal a change in Washington’s approach, but rather reflects the reality that the maximum pressure policy has failed to roll back Iran’s nuclear program to zero. In other words, the remarks mirror the assessment that the balance of technical and political power has shifted, and the United States is now compelled to confront the reality of Iran’s existing capacity rather than expect a complete rollback.