EU’s dangerous precedent for IRGC to fall flat
The European Union’s move to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization could carry legal, political and security consequences that go well beyond a one-off decision. The measure lacks legitimacy, is marked by normative contradictions and legal weaknesses, and risks creating destabilizing repercussions for the international order as well as for regional and global security.
The EU’s action is not directed only at a military organization, but from the perspective of Iranian public opinion, it is widely perceived as an affront to national sovereignty and collective dignity, given that the IRGC, as one of the pillars of national defense and a protector of the country’s interests, holds an established and deeply rooted position in Iran’s lived social experience.
Labeling an official state institutions as “terrorist” represents a dangerous precedent in international relations and runs counter to the core principles of international law, including state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. The EU’s selective and overtly political approach to defining and applying the concept of terrorism seriously undermines its moral and legal credibility to act as an impartial arbiter in this domain. According to reports and acknowledgements from Western sources, a significant number of individuals active in extremist terrorist groups such as ISIS (Daesh) have had European origins, a reality that raises serious questions about the security responsibilities of European governments themselves. At critical junctures, the IRGC have played an effective and transnational role in containing ISIS terrorism, a threat that was not confined to West Asia, but directly targeted the security of Europe and the United States as well. This provocative and irresponsible step, spearheaded by certain European states including Germany and the United Kingdom, falls politically in line with the demands of the Israeli regime and with hardline factions shaping US policy.
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