Renewed aggression unlikely but Iran to hit back more forcefully to any attack
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
US President Donald Trump was asked on December 29 whether he would support an Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic should it continue developing its missile and nuclear programs. He said “if it’s the missile program, definitely yes, and if it’s the nuclear program, fast.”
Iranian officials, meanwhile, warned against any act of aggression. President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a post on X that Iran’s response to any unjust aggression would be harsh and regret-inducing. Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iran’s Leader, wrote in a post that some responses were determined before threats reach the implementation stage, a remark that, according to some observers, could allude to the possibility of preemptive action by Iran.
These statements have fueled speculation about the likelihood of another war between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other. Abbas Aslani, an international affairs analyst, told Iran Daily that indicators suggest the probability of a renewed military attack on Iran was low, though it could not be entirely ruled out.
IRAN DAILY: Do Trump’s remarks about striking Iran’s missile program if development continues amount merely to diplomatic maneuvering and psychological pressure, or do they signal a shift in actual US policy toward Iran?
ASLANI: A combination of both elements should be taken into account. This does not necessarily signify a policy change. US policy, particularly during the Trump era, has followed the same trajectory, with efforts aimed at inflicting as much damage and pressure on Iran as possible. Psychological warfare has always been part of this strategy and continues to be so. While there may currently be no clear signs of imminent action against Iran, threats are being used to hold back Iran’s growth and progress in the defense sector or to prevent its recovery.
What is implicit here, however, is an acknowledgment that the United States and Israel failed during the 12-day war to destroy Iran’s military and defensive infrastructure. This task is inherently extremely difficult given the nature and characteristics of Iran’s defensive capabilities. For the same reason they failed in the past, it seems unlikely they will succeed in the future.
At the same time, a relative shift can be observed. Previously, statements and positions focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear program, with Washington claiming its main concern was preventing Iran from moving toward a nuclear weapon. What has now been added is the missile issue, which Israel is attempting to push onto the US agenda. This, in turn, underscores another point. In effect, these remarks strip away the pretense that the United States was concerned only with the nuclear file, making the underlying issue more explicit.
Accordingly, the statements amount both to an admission that the nuclear issue was merely a pretext and, more importantly, to an implicit acknowledgment that Iran’s missile program has not been damaged.
Considering these remarks, how serious do you assess the likelihood of a military attack on Iran at this stage? Do conditions on the ground even permit such an action by the United States or Israel?
Several points must be considered. First is the objective of any potential military action and whether that objective is achievable. As in the previous round [the 12-day war], Iran’s missile capabilities could not be seriously damaged, and there is again no guarantee such an outcome could be achieved. Launching a new adventure would also impose costs on the attackers themselves, raising questions about the cost-benefit calculus.
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