Iraqi government, popular forces reject using their territory against Iran
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
The use of Iraqi airspace for operations against Iran has been a growing topic of discussion since the 12-day war. Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadeq, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, recently Tehran has identified US surveillance flights that used Iraqi airspace to monitor Iranian territory. Why the Iraqi government, despite its friendly relations with Iran, would allow such use of its airspace has become a matter of debate. At the same time, Iraq, seeking to stay clear of confrontation between Iran and the United States, has launched efforts to broker dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani said Baghdad had proposed to Washington that Iraq’s constructive ties with Iran be leveraged to help revive Tehran–Washington talks, adding that an important effort was underway to arrange a bilateral meeting between Iran and the United States in Baghdad. Iran Daily spoke with Hassan Hanizadeh, a regional affairs analyst, to examine the issue. Hanizadeh believes that both the government in Baghdad and popular forces oppose the use of Iraqi territory against Iran, but with thousands of US troops still in Iraq, Baghdad’s ability to firmly oppose American adventurism remains restricted.
IRAN DAILY: How do you assess the Iraqi government allowing the United States to use Iraqi airspace for reconnaissance operations against Iran, and what security and political consequences does this have for Tehran-Baghdad relations?
HANIZADEH: There are reports indicating that US forces stationed in Iraq have recently carried out a series of intelligence and aerial activities along the shared Iran-Iraq border. The purpose of these movements, which have typically involved the use of advanced aircraft, has been to gather information on Iran’s military deployments and missile bases in northwestern Iran. Some military observers view these activities as routine and preemptive measures by US forces, aimed at preparing for any potential Iranian action.
Page 8