Arab role in averting war between Iran, Israel
By Jasser Al-Shahed
Expert on Middle Eastern affairs
The Arab region is facing one of its most volatile periods in decades as rising tensions between Israel and Iran spill across the region, driven by deep ideological divisions, prolonged shadow wars, and confrontation over nuclear development.
This complex, multidimensional rivalry has had wide-ranging consequences for Arab states. It has drawn them into the trajectories of the conflict, threatened their national security and critical infrastructure, and pushed them into unprecedented arms races.
Given the strong possibility of a new military confrontation between the two sides, Arab states must urgently move to explore alternatives for managing this potential escalation in order to avoid its negative repercussions.
This article argues that convening an international conference on “security in the Middle East” could achieve this goal by adopting implementable interim measures.
Recent statements by military and political officials in both Iran and Israel reflect an unprecedented escalation in tensions, amid mutual warnings of an approaching confrontation.
Leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and armed forces have announced heightened military readiness, stressing their preparedness to respond to any Israeli attack in a “strong and surprising” manner.
Following the end of the 12-day war, Iran also strengthened its missile and air-defence capabilities, intensified military exercises, and prepared for multiple scenarios, including direct strikes or actions carried out through regional allies.
On the other side, the Israeli military has continued to update its operational plans and raise readiness levels on multiple fronts, in anticipation of a direct Iranian response or attacks by Iran-aligned armed groups.
Israeli officials have warned that the confrontation with Iran is approaching a “decisive point” aimed at destroying its nuclear programme and eliminating its backed groups in the region.
In the absence of urgent political intervention and effective mechanisms to contain this escalation, the risks of the region sliding into deeper instability continue to grow, especially amid increasing provocations, the overlap of regional arenas, and the possibility of miscalculation by both sides.
In this context, international and regional powers must move to establish frameworks capable of preventing escalation and sparing the region from new wars.
However, pursuing comprehensive regional security mechanisms, such as those proposed in academic discussions, or aspiring to resolve all disputed issues between Israel and Iran in a sweeping manner, remains unrealistic under current conditions.
The multiplicity of contentious files between the two sides creates an environment hostile to de-escalation initiatives, while deep mutual distrust, coupled with existential security concerns, makes cooperation extremely difficult.
Accordingly, peace initiatives, including the recent cease-fire agreement following the 12-day war or confidence-building measures, are often viewed as tactical manoeuvres that allow the other side to buy time and reposition, rather than as genuine tools for reducing tensions.
In contrast to such comprehensive approaches, other recent attempts to manage the conflict have also proven limited and ineffective in preventing escalation.
During the administration of US President Donald Trump, Washington’s Middle East policy was based on a “maximum pressure” approach toward Iran, combining military and economic pressure with unconditional support for Israel.
The US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the imposition of sweeping sanctions were key elements of this strategy, aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear programme and regional influence.
However, this confrontational approach, followed by direct military strikes against Iran, failed to alter Iranian behaviour or satisfy Israel’s ambition to overthrow the Iranian regime and fully dismantle its nuclear programme.
Overall, this policy did not succeed in containing the Israeli–Iranian conflict or laying the foundations for a sustainable de-escalation; rather, it effectively deepened regional tensions by making the United States a direct party to the confrontation with Iran.
In the aftermath, regional actors sought to mitigate the risks created by this strategic vacuum.
Egypt, along with other Arab states, focused on crisis-containment and “firefighting” diplomacy, as well as multilateral mechanisms aimed at curbing escalation.
Cairo’s hosting of the September 2025 meeting between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which resulted in the resumption of technical cooperation, reflects Egypt’s desire to ease one of the files that could trigger renewed confrontation in the region.
Egyptian moves in the Lebanese arena, including the dispatch of the intelligence chief and the foreign minister and the emphasis on implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and strengthening Lebanese state institutions, also reflect efforts to contain tensions.
Nevertheless, neither US pressure policies nor Egypt’s “firefighting” diplomacy have succeeded in halting the escalation trajectory.
Zero-sum calculations continue to dominate Israeli–Iranian relations, deepening regional instability and keeping the prospect of a wider war alive.
It can be argued that Israel will push to sustain this tense status quo, driven by domestic electoral considerations, the stance of the far right, fears of a faster resumption of Iranian nuclear activities, and uncertainty surrounding the fate of approximately 450 kilograms of enriched uranium, whose whereabouts remain unknown following the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities.
This reality compels Arab states to reassess their approaches to this issue, which casts a long shadow over regional security and Arab stability.
Rather than pursuing ambitious frameworks aimed at fundamentally changing the policies of both sides or waiting for a breakthrough in one of the disputed files, such as a comprehensive resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue that satisfies all parties, decision-makers should prioritize incremental, reciprocal arrangements that are politically acceptable and capable of reducing escalation risks.
Such arrangements should establish a minimum set of constraints to prevent the region from sliding into a full-scale war, without necessarily delivering immediate solutions to the underlying disputes.
Within this framework, an international conference on “Security in the Middle East,” held under the auspices of major powers and the United Nations, could serve as a platform to agree on practical, temporary measures. These steps would aim to reinforce the fragile cease-fires in Gaza and Lebanon, limit the risk of regional escalation, and prevent further deterioration or a slide into a new military confrontation.
Naturally, such a conference would not seek to resolve the core disputes between Israel and Iran or broker grand bargains, but rather to provide space for regional actors, in coordination with international parties, to agree on specific, narrowly defined security measures designed to prevent the recurrence of confrontations.
Despite the clear challenges facing the implementation of such ideas, they offer a political opportunity to launch joint efforts to preserve regional stability and reduce risks, without making comprehensive settlements a precondition.
At a moment when the region faces the possibility of renewed military confrontations affecting several Arab states, the proposed Middle East security conference, or the temporary regional security measures it might produce, may not resolve the disputes between Israel and Iran. However, it could at least provide an urgent exit by containing escalation, preserving a degree of fragile stability, and avoiding wide-ranging negative repercussions for the Arab world.
The full article first appeared on Ahram Online.