Iran-IAEA re-engagement hinges on technical mandate, political neutrality
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has requested access to sites in Iran that were damaged during the 12-day war in June, repeatedly underscoring the importance of monitoring these facilities due to the presence of highly enriched uranium stockpiles and other equipment. Iran, however, argues that any visit to such sites requires a special protocol, noting that it is unprecedented for facilities under IAEA safeguards to come under attack. Iranian officials have raised safety and security concerns and stressed that inspections cannot take place without a dedicated framework.
Previously, Iran and the IAEA had reached an understanding in Cairo on post-war cooperation, which Tehran later declared null and void after the three European parties to the Iran 2015 nuclear deal – Britain, France and Germany – triggered the snapback mechanism under the accord to reinstate UN sanctions on the Islamic Republic. In his latest remarks, Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that if the IAEA had designed a guideline for monitoring and inspections, Iran would review it.
In an interview with Iran Daily, international affairs expert Abed Akbari explored the technical dimensions of the issue and the expectations on both sides. According to Akbari, the future of Iran-IAEA engagement depends above all on the agency’s adherence to its technical mandate and its avoidance of political considerations.
IRAN DAILY: Iran insists that a special protocol must be drafted for inspections of sites damaged during the war. What features should such a protocol have to satisfy Iran?
AKBARI: Iran’s position is grounded in well-established legal principles within the non-proliferation regime. Any inspection beyond standard safeguards obligations can only be considered under a special, case-specific and time-bound protocol. Such a protocol must, first and foremost, be based on full respect for Iran’s national sovereignty and national security. Second, it should prevent technical inspections from being turned into tools of pressure or mechanisms for collecting irrelevant information.
Under such a framework, the scope of inspections must be precisely defined, strictly limited to clearly specified technical objectives, and free from any expansive interpretation. The presence of inspectors should be controlled, based on an agreed list of names, and carried out under Iran’s direct supervision. In addition, sampling procedures, access to documents, and the use of monitoring equipment must be designed in a way that ensures no sensitive information, particularly non-nuclear military or industrial data, is put at risk.
Another key element is the provision of clear legal guarantees by the agency regarding data confidentiality and accountability in the event of any potential misuse. Without such guarantees, expectations of cooperation beyond safeguards obligations would neither be realistic nor reliable.
Given that these sites were damaged in US and Israeli attacks, why is the agency insisting on inspecting them?
From both legal and political perspectives, the IAEA’s insistence on inspecting sites that were damaged in military attacks by the United States and Israel requires careful redefinition. The agency argues that it needs to examine these locations to maintain “continuity of knowledge” regarding past nuclear materials and activities.
However, it should be noted that responsibility for any ambiguity surrounding the status of these sites lies with those parties that illegally attacked safeguarded nuclear facilities in violation of international law. It cannot be expected that a country which has been the victim of military action should also bear the political and security costs through unlimited inspections.
Iran has repeatedly stated that the physical destruction of a site does not necessarily imply the emergence of a new unresolved safeguards issue. Any review must therefore be based on credible documentation, clear technical justifications, and within the framework of defined rights and obligations, not on assumptions or political pressure.
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