Russia, China and ...
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However, the international landscape has shifted. The United States is now pursuing a full-scale strategy to contain and weaken China, Russia and even India, and therefore has little interest in resolving global issues in partnership with these powers. Moreover, containing Iran is itself part of Washington’s broader strategy to constrain China and Russia. A weakened Iran in the Middle East creates more room to encircle Moscow and Beijing. Thus, Russia and China also have strong incentives not to let Washington gain the upper hand in the Iran file.
In this context, economic and security support from Russia and China through bilateral, multilateral or institutional cooperation could reinforce not only Iran’s position vis-à-vis the United States but also their own standing in the face of mounting American pressure.
To what extent are China, Russia and India willing to incur costs to protect Iran’s interests under US pressure?
Their readiness to bear costs is naturally bounded. In the short term, these states do not want the Iran-US dispute to evolve into a direct confrontation between themselves and Washington. In the long term, they prefer that support for Iran translate into geopolitical and geoeconomic leverage for them, not merely end in a bilateral deal between Tehran and Washington.
Among them, India—lingering between East and West—is expected to approach the Iran issue with greater caution.
Could the growing intimacy of these three countries with Iran pave the way for a non-Western coalition against the United States, or is this just situational cooperation?
Based on the considerations outlined, the likelihood of a formal, overt anti-US coalition emerging around the Iran issue is low. Iran, Russia, China and India all seek to expand their power relative to the United States, but their priorities, constraints and issue areas differ. They also have varying dynamics within their bilateral and multilateral relations.
A tactical convergence is possible; a strategic one is not. It should also be remembered that even among the United States and Europe—actors with far deeper structural alignment—their approaches frequently diverge. Washington is, in fact, pursuing dominance even over Europe itself.