Economic interdependence could ...
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Regarding the Arash gas field, what legal, technical and diplomatic tools do Saudi Arabia and Kuwait possess to substantiate their claims, and how much might these tools enhance their chances of success?
The Arash gas field is shared between Iran and Kuwait, and it has recently been declared to overlap with parts claimed by Saudi Arabia. Although Iran and Saudi Arabia have delimited their maritime boundaries, Iran has not yet finalized such boundaries with Kuwait. As a result, maritime zones, including the seabed, subsoil and related resources, remain undefined between Iran and Kuwait. Negotiations spanning for decades have failed to produce a resolution.
Defining maritime boundaries between Iran and Kuwait is therefore essential. Once those boundaries are established, Iran and Kuwait could address the Arash field bilaterally and prevent the issue from becoming another permanent fixture in GCC communiqués.
The Arab bloc has linked the islands issue to its collective security and the same dynamic must be prevented regarding the Arash field, and Iran should act to stop further alignment among Persian Gulf Arab states on this matter.
What legal, diplomatic and technical capacities does Iran possess to defend its rights against these claims?
Iran’s options must be viewed as one part of a broader picture of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. Iran’s de-escalation efforts, especially in recent years, have helped reduce tensions with Persian Gulf states. They recently underscored at the Manama Security Conference that Iran should not be excluded from regional security structures. These states have drawn lessons from history, recognizing that excluding Iran cannot deliver regional stability and that lasting stability requires Iran’s inclusion.
Iran’s most effective course is to continue this de-escalatory path while strengthening its national power and wealth. Unless Iran becomes sufficiently strong and develops extensive mutual economic interdependence with other states, anchoring its weight in bilateral and multilateral relations, the cost of opposing Iran or siding with its rivals will remain low for other countries.
If Iran’s national power – economic, social, political and cultural – stagnates and fails to engage with other states and build up reciprocal dependencies, supporting the UAE will remain the cheaper option for other actors. By altering this equation Iran can halt the momentum behind claims to its territorial sovereignty and simultaneously align other countries with its stance.