UN chief’s report ...
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Given these dynamics, Guterres understands that as long as these institutions operate within the interests of powerful states, they survive. Expecting him to take a position on Iran’s nuclear file and the snapback dispute that openly contradicts the positions of the United States, the EU and the broader Western bloc and aligns instead with China and Russia is extremely unlikely. His stance is therefore not expected to satisfy Tehran.
How can Iran leverage the divisions among permanent Security Council members, especially between Western powers and Russia and China, to reinforce its diplomatic position and mitigate international pressure?
Historical experience shows that the Islamic Republic has rarely benefited from such divisions. There is little reason to believe this long-standing pattern will suddenly reverse.
Moreover, the current Security Council structure largely aligns with Russian and Chinese interests. No decision contrary to their key interests can be taken due to the veto. In fact, it is the United States whose long-term position is weakened by a Security Council system that constrains major-power behavior more than it enables collective action.
Russia and China also understand that pushing the US into a position where the Security Council no longer serves its interests — limiting its positive influence while retaining strong negative constraints — could hasten the collapse of an order in which Moscow and Beijing themselves hold substantial influence. Expecting a serious confrontation between Russia and China and the US and Europe over Iran is therefore unlikely.
If Western efforts to pressure Iran through Resolution 2231 and snapback ultimately fail, what legal or institutional alternatives could they turn to sustain pressure?
Iran is already under Chapter VII, Article 41. It would be relatively straightforward to piece together IAEA reports, document Iran’s actions, such as missile activities, the expansion of enrichment capacity, or support for regional resistance groups, and to justify a referral from Article 41 to Article 42.
Such a shift could pave the way for the formation of a coalition against Iran. Expecting legal or institutional mechanisms to block such a move would be a mistake. What can truly alter this trajectory is reducing the threat perception surrounding Iran by demonstrating fundamental changes in its operational intentions. If such shifts do not occur, international legal mechanisms will likely work against Iran.