UN chief’s report unlikely to satisfy Iran
By Delaram Ahmadi
Staff writer
Tensions between Iran, the IAEA and the UN Security Council remain among Tehran’s most consequential foreign-policy files. Recently, Russia’s envoy to international organizations in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, held talks with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi about Iran. The UN nuclear agency continues to demand access to facilities damaged during the 12-day war in June as well as to Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium. Iran, citing post-war security concerns, insists on a new cooperation framework, one that had been reflected in the “Cairo understanding” but was voided after the activation of snapback.
Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres is set to brief the Security Council on the status of Resolution 2231, which underpinned the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA). Iran argues that the resolution has expired and that its nuclear file should be taken off the UN’s agenda, while Western states insist that the September activation of the snapback clause has restored all pre-JCPOA sanctions.
China and Russia, alongside Iran, have again written to the UN and the Security Council, stressing that the resolution has lapsed. With Western pressure mounting, can reliance on China, Russia and international mechanisms realistically shield Iran? International affairs analyst Gholamreza Haddad has told Iran Daily that such mechanisms predominantly serve the interests of major powers, and that Iran should instead work to reduce the “threat perception” surrounding it.
IRAN DAILY: After the invalidation of the Cairo understanding, can Russia realistically mediate a new monitoring mechanism between Iran and the IAEA, or is the trajectory still pointing toward escalating confrontation?
HADDAD: Such expectations are unrealistic. Given Russia’s diminished diplomatic weight, largely due to the Ukraine war and wide-ranging international sanctions, Moscow no longer enjoys the leverage it once had. Also, based on the Islamic Republic’s publicly declared policies and considering the heavy costs it has already borne, a new mechanism is unlikely to take shape. The IAEA’s demands include maximum monitoring and full clarification regarding Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium and Iran has openly rejected such conditions in the current climate. Therefore, the path appears to be moving toward ratcheting up confrontation rather than easing it.
How might China and Russia’s positions influence the content or orientation of the UN secretary-general’s report which is due in December 13?
From the perspective of the international political-economy order, the world is moving toward divergence. The post-WWII cooperation-based order, shaped by the United States’ hegemonic will and enabling globalization and institutionalized cooperation, is undergoing a major shift toward more zero-sum dynamics and competition over relative gains.
The resurgence of tariff-driven policies, protectionism and a neo-capitalist approach in US foreign policymaking are key signs of this turn away from cooperative regimes. Under these evolving conditions, cooperation frameworks survive only when they do not clash with the interests of major powers, especially the hegemon.
As a result, the credibility and effectiveness of cooperative regimes have declined. The UN, perhaps the most expansive cooperative regime in an anarchic international environment, is facing the consequences of this trend. International organizations, the operational arms of such regimes, are fully aware of this erosion, which makes their role increasingly difficult. The secretary-general himself appears acutely aware of this reality. He sees that the hegemon which once bankrolled, strengthened and institutionalized these mechanisms, has been steadily pulling out of many institutions, from the WHO and UNESCO to the Human Rights Council and environmental accords, and may even reconsider participation in security alliances such as NATO.
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