Netanyahu weighs Iran ...
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Israel did inflict serious damage on Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, command structure, and senior leadership, but in terms of changing Lebanon’s political order to Hezbollah’s detriment, which is Israel’s strategic objective, very little progress has been made over the past year. Efforts to disarm Hezbollah or place all weapons solely under the control of the Lebanese army have been minimal. The process Israel hoped to see simply has not materialized. As a result, Israel now considers the Lebanon file an urgent priority. Without a more forceful push toward disarmament, Hezbollah could eventually make up for the previous losses through reconstruction.
Lebanon also carries another layer of strategic significance. A confrontation there could ignite regional conflict. Escalation in Lebanon could spill over into neighboring states. Should Hezbollah find itself on the brink of disarmament, and Israel insist on imposing it militarily, potentially by sending its own forces and triggering another war, Iran might feel compelled to defend Hezbollah decisively.
On the rhetorical front, with elections six to ten months away, Israeli politicians, especially a prime minister seeking re-election, have every incentive to crank up their political messaging. Netanyahu recently claimed in an interview that Israel “achieved its objectives” during the 12-day war with Iran, even though some of those goals included political change in Tehran, which Israel clearly did not achieve, or shifts in the military balance that ultimately were not realized despite the damage inflicted on Iran’s defense systems. So, although there is a degree of seriousness in his remarks, they also serve a political and promotional purpose and both aspects should be considered.
Given the recent military activity near Iran’s western borders, is there a direct connection between these developments and Netanyahu’s statements?
It appears the answer is yes. There is likely a direct link between incidents such as fighter jets reportedly entering Iraqi airspace, flying close to Iran’s border, and Netanyahu’s recent statements. Israel seems intent on provoking Iran into a reaction, gradually creating the pretext needed for a new confrontation. This suggests the region may be entering a ladder of escalation, moving steadily toward heightened tension.
What scenarios could lead to a renewed confrontation between Iran and Israel, and how likely are they in the short term?
The first point is that if Netanyahu’s domestic situation remains precarious, and if other agendas that could help him regain popularity fail to yield results, he may attempt to offset his legitimacy deficit through renewed military action against Iran.
Several major issues could influence Israel’s next elections and Netanyahu’s potential political recovery. One is, of course, the Iran file. Another concerns formal annexation of the West Bank, or parts of it. A third relates to the future of Hamas; removing Hamas entirely from power in the Gaza Strip and allowing Netanyahu to present a political victory domestically. Another important one is the disarmament of Hezbollah. Finally, normalization with Saudi Arabia is also on his agenda, and time is running short before elections.
If Netanyahu fails to make progress on these fronts, he could be pushed toward renewed confrontation with Iran.
Iran’s internal political and social conditions will also be crucial. Should domestic dissatisfaction rise, widening the gap between the public and the state, and should new waves of protest emerge, the chances of confrontation would sharply increase, with Israel, and potentially the United States, almost certainly taking advantage of such conditions.
Negotiations between Iran and Western parties are another factor. If diplomatic talks advance seriously, tensions could ease. But for now, tensions remain relatively high.