Regional integration of Iran & Turkey: The path to cooperation in a complex Middle East
By Asgar Ghahremanpour
Editor-in-chief
In the complex and rapidly transforming landscape of the Middle East, the relationship between Iran and Turkey has reached a stage that can be described as a “transition toward functional integration,” a phase in which shared security, economic, and geopolitical interests provide stronger incentives for closer ties than ever before, despite enduring structural and historical rivalries. Integration theory suggests that regional states move toward sustained cooperation when practical interactions increase the costs of confrontation and make the benefits of collaboration tangible and measurable. The current position of Iran and Turkey exemplifies this scenario: situated between competition and cooperation, where the weight of cooperative factors is rising, potentially generating positive spillover effects in other domains.
Amid ongoing security threats along the shared borders of Syria and Iraq, and a geopolitically unsettled South Caucasus following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, both countries perceive regional developments not as a series of isolated crises but as a “threat linkage.” Turkey is particularly concerned about the role of Kurdish groups in northern Syria, while Iran emphasizes the preservation of Syria’s central governance and territorial integrity. Though these objectives appear distinct, at the broader level of regional security, they overlap: neither Tehran nor Ankara seeks Syria’s fragmentation, nor do they wish for external actors to alter the regional balance of power through new spheres of influence. This security alignment, a fundamental basis for integration in neofunctionalism theory, has rendered security dialogues an indispensable and continuous feature of bilateral relations.
Beyond security concerns, the economic dimension plays a critical role in enabling integration. The targeted trade volume of $30 billion is not merely a media talking point but a cornerstone for developing mutual interdependence—a type of interconnection that European Union experience demonstrates can ultimately reduce the costs of political tension and enhance institutional cooperation. Iran serves as a primary route for Turkey’s access to affordable and reliable energy, while Turkey provides Iran with a crucial gateway to European and Mediterranean markets. Developing transit projects, including the reinforcement of the East-West corridor, expansion of rail capacity, and establishment of border trade hubs, exemplify the “functional spillover” effect, whereby cooperation in one sector (e.g., infrastructure) inevitably leads to cooperation in others. Expanding joint infrastructure reaches a point where any political tension incurs immediate and tangible economic costs—precisely the condition in which integration begins.
Another factor influencing Iran-Turkey integration is the evolving power structure in the region. Following the Gaza conflict, widespread humanitarian crises, and unprecedented external interventions, both countries face direct and indirect pressures. Iran must manage tensions with Israel and the United States while simultaneously seeking to build new regional networks of cooperation. Turkey, similarly, strives to restore its regional standing and mitigate Western pressure while taking a more active role in the Palestinian issue and Gaza reconstruction. These shared pressures have created a need for Tehran and Ankara to establish a stable “diplomatic contact point,” capable of reducing regional tensions and enhancing the influence of both states.
Nevertheless, Iran-Turkey integration faces significant obstacles that any realistic analysis must acknowledge. Geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus retains the potential for serious tensions. Turkey maintains strategic ties with Azerbaijan, whereas Iran aims to stabilize international borders and prevent abrupt geopolitical shifts. In Syria, while shared threats have incentivized cooperation, the ultimate objectives of the two countries differ in some respects.
Page 2