Proportional elections a courageous step along an arduous trajectory
By Hojatollah Ayoubi
Head of int’l affairs at Iran’s Ministry of Cultural Heritage
The implementation of city council elections in Tehran on the basis of a proportional system is courageous and facilitative. Yet its success is contingent upon the resolution of several technical and legal issues, the guarantee of financial transparency, and the genuineness of parties and political coalitions. Negligent attention to these subtleties may divert this experiment toward outcomes such as inefficacy or corruption.
Issue of determining threshold
Mere proportionality in elections is insufficient for genuine partitocracy. Global experience indicates that the absence of a “threshold,” or the establishment of a very low threshold, will engender the proliferation of fictitious parties and electoral lists that have no social base. Therefore, it must be determined what percentage of the votes constitutes the condition for a party or list to enter the stage of seat allocation; for instance, there’s the reasonable span of 3 to 8 percent, but it must be determined through simulation, the study of global experiences, and the political circumstances of the country. This threshold delineates the boundary between parties with authentic constituencies and the emergence of ephemeral coalitions.
Allocation of remaining seats
After tabulation, a portion of the votes invariably remains as a fraction of a single seat. For distributing this fraction among lists, numerous methods exist, such as “D’Hondt” or “Sainte-Laguë,” which will produce divergent consequences for representation and political equilibrium. Hence, the precise method and the accepted mathematical formula must be determined and inscribed in the bylaws, so that ambiguity, disagreement, and impairment of public trust are forestalled.
Presence of independent candidates
The combination of party lists with independent candidates introduces a new veil of complexity. In many proportional representation systems, competition is predominantly list-based, and the entry of independents renders the calculations for seat allocation arduous and “unprecedented”. A lucid mechanism is required for determining the manner of calculating the share of independents, the relation of individual vote totals with lists, and the hierarchy of priority in allocating seats, so that no technical disputations arise after the announcement of results.
Genuineness of parties, necessity of financial transparency
It is vital that coalitions and parties possess genuineness and a real social base. The formation of coalitions a few days prior to elections, which are organized solely for financial or media-related purposes, does not contribute to genuine partitocracy and also disarranges the landscape of electoral expenditures. To avert this circumstance, rules of financial transparency and specific restrictions must be established. The following mechanisms may be employed:
• Mandatory establishment of an electoral account: Every party, coalition, or candidate shall be obliged to open an electoral account before the elections and to conduct all receipts and expenditures exclusively through that account, which shall be accessible to the Ministry of Interior and the supervisory authority.
• Restriction of monetary contributions: A defined ceiling shall be established for financial contributions by natural persons. Monetary contributions outside the banking network shall be prohibited.
• Prohibition of legal and corporate contributions: Private companies, legal entities, and enterprises shall be barred from providing direct payments to parties or coalitions.
• Perpetual transparency: Periodic reports of resources and expenditures must be published publicly, and the possibility of independent auditing must be provided.
• Rational support for small parties: To reinforce genuine partitocracy, reasonable educational or media resources must be provided for parties with a minimal social base, so that competition does not devolve into financial bargaining.
• A robust and competent supervisory body: The establishment or reinforcement of an independent and capable institution for supervising electoral financing and imposing deterrent fines is necessary.
The implementation of the proportional representation system in city council elections can accelerate partitocracy and fortify political institutions. Yet correct advancement is conditional upon the adoption of preliminary technical and legal decisions and the institution of transparent financial rules. It is proposed that the Ministry of Interior (1) determine and, through simulation, announce a rational threshold, (2) publish the formula for allocating remaining seats beforehand, (3) elucidate the mechanism for the presence of independents, and (4) implement the regulations of financial transparency and the independent supervisory authority before the commencement of elections. If these guarantees are instituted, the experience of proportional elections can be transformed into a positive and enduring evolution within the party system. I wish the success of this trial in realizing sustainable popular sovereignty.
The article first appeared in the
Persian-language Iran Newspaper.