Balancing engagement, leverage; Iran’s most rational response to IAEA resolution
Last week the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors adopted a resolution against Iran, drafted by the United States and the E3 (France, Germany and Britain). The text calls on Iran to cooperate immediately with the agency, provide detailed information on its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and grant access to nuclear sites damaged during US strike in June.
Tehran has dismissed the resolution as “illegal, political and unjustified,” describing it as a sign of Western “ill will,” adding that it will deliver a proportionate response.
Iran traditionally used to answer such resolutions by ramping up enrichment capacity and levels. The situation today, however, is markedly different. Iran’s main nuclear facilities were bombed by the United States during the 12-day conflict and severely damaged, halting all enrichment activity, according to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Iran has also sharply reduced its cooperation with the IAEA and has declared the “Cairo Agreement”, a new framework for post-war coordination, void following Europe’s decision to reinstate UN sanctions.
Against this backdrop, what options does Tehran have? Abed Akbari, an international affairs analyst, told Iran Daily that Iran’s choices range from technical engagement to deterrent steps, though a calibrated middle course, combining conditional interaction with the preservation of leverage, is the most logical way to keep things on track.
IRAN DAILY: What options does Iran have in responding to the IAEA’s latest resolution?
AKBARI: Iran faces a set of clearly tiered options, stretching from technical engagement to deterrent measures. At the first level, Tehran can adopt a “conditional cooperation” approach and enter a managed technical dialogue with the agency, signaling a principled readiness to clarify ambiguities and provide nuclear-material accounting while setting clear boundaries on confidentiality and access. This approach helps keep the political temperature down and serves as an important tool to head off accusations of “non-cooperation”.
At the second level, Iran can turn to political and legal instruments: filing an official protest over the politicization of the process, activating multilateral channels and raising legal objections to how the resolution was drafted. This path carries fewer costs and maintains a balance between political resistance and preventing the crisis from spiraling.
At the third level lie more confrontational measures, such as limiting certain forms of technical cooperation, suspending specific inspections or stepping up nuclear activities within Iran’s legal framework. Although such steps offer deterrent value, they carry a higher political price and could set the stage for more severe tensions in the file.
Overall, blending a phased approach, conditional engagement alongside the preservation of pressure levers, stands out as the most rational course for Iran at this point.
What consequences might Iran’s response have for tensions between Iran and the agency, and between Iran and the West?
The fallout depends entirely on the nature and intensity of Iran’s reaction. Should Tehran opt for managed technical cooperation, short-term tensions with the agency would ease, paving the way for more balanced IAEA reporting, which could in turn hold back Europe from pursuing tougher actions and open space for engagement.
Conversely, if Iran responds solely with political rejection of the resolution, friction with the agency, especially the E3, will rise, increasing the likelihood of further resolutions and sustained political pressure, though such a stance might have domestic mobilization value.
Page 2