Change of mediator ...

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At best, Saudi Arabia might be able to act as a limited facilitator, not a full-scale mediator. And even that seems unlikely to be effective given current US positions. In fact, the main problem between Iran and the US has nothing to do with who mediates, it stems from entrenched positions. Washington is not genuinely seeking negotiations, it is pushing for its set of demands and says talks would take place only if Tehran accepts them. Iran views that as imposition or dictation, an approach that cannot lead to meaningful results.
As long as the US maintains such a stance, switching mediators will not help. A mediator should not be mistaken for a savior; the core problem lies elsewhere.
One more point is that in the past, Saudi Arabia may have opposed any US-Iran agreement, especially on the nuclear front. Today, Riyadh may believe it could benefit from a resolution and therefore shows willingness. Still, this is insufficient. The issues at stake are too complex, with too many variables, and mutual distrust is deeper than ever. So, while Riyadh’s declared willingness is not unwelcome, it falls far short of creating conditions for a meaningful agreement, particularly as Washington has not altered its fundamental position.
 
Compared with traditional mediators such as Oman and Qatar, what advantages or challenges would Saudi Arabia face?
Traditional mediators like Oman and Qatar have established records. Oman’s long experience in mediation, combined with strong ties to both Iran and the United States, has enabled it to carve out a reputation for neutrality. Its close relations with Washington have never compromised its ties with Tehran, which is precisely why it has sometimes been effective.
Qatar also maintains very close relations with the US, but after its dispute with Saudi Arabia in recent years, Doha’s relations with Tehran shifted in quality, enabling it to step in at certain moments in a limited capacity. Qatar has also tried to present itself as a mediator in cases unrelated to Iran, and this broader portfolio has occasionally had spill-over effects on Iran-US issues.
The nature of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Tehran, however, is qualitatively different. Even if Riyadh’s leadership currently enjoys warm ties with the US president, that alone is not enough. And more importantly, mediation is not the real issue here. The actual obstacle lies in the positions held by the parties, positions Iran did not change even after the recent military strike. It is unrealistic to expect that shifting the mediator would somehow turn the page.
 
Given the regional rivalry and history of tensions, how far is Iran willing to trust Saudi Arabia?
The matter is not one of Iran trusting Saudi Arabia. The core negotiation and the core balance must ultimately be established between Iran and the United States. Dialogue between those two has always been defined by mutual distrust. Whether Iran and Saudi Arabia trust one another is beside the point, because it does not address the main issue.
Even if Tehran and Riyadh were to reach an understanding, the primary party Iran must talk to remains the United States. Saudi Arabia cannot be the party that determines the future path of Iran-US diplomacy.
 
On the international stage, how do major powers such as China and Russia view Saudi Arabia’s potential attempt to play a role in this file, and would they support it?
This is ultimately a question Beijing and Moscow can answer more definitively. It also seems too early to speak with certainty. But if the question is whether they will obstruct such a role or support it, it appears likely that both capitals would prefer to see the issue resolved. Any initiative that could push the process forward would presumably be welcomed.
But the situation has not reached that stage yet. What exists so far is merely a unilateral statement by Trump in front of cameras about a supposed negotiating track, one that in reality does not exist. The US and Iran are not engaged in any meaningful or serious negotiation at present. No process has been launched. That makes Trump’s announcement somewhat puzzling, and it leaves the topic far from any phase where serious discussion about great-power reactions would make sense. This question, therefore, belongs to a later stage, one that has not yet materialized.

 

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