Membership gains in ...
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Since SCO member states collectively account for 40% of the world’s population, access to these markets has made Western sanctions harder to carry through, even though banking sanctions and intra-SCO competition still impose limits on how far this resilience can go.
In your view, how much can Iran rely on the actual implementation of SCO documents and memoranda?
Given that the SCO was formed along the lines of global standards rooted in liberal institutionalism, Iran can expect a moderate level of implementation. The success of these memoranda depends heavily on reciprocal commitments from member states, their conflicts of interest in dealings with the West and their administrative capacity. It is essential to view the SCO primarily as a framework rather than a strict enforcement mechanism, which distinguishes it from more institutionalized bodies such as the European Union.
How has SCO membership affected the East-West balance in Iran’s foreign policy? Can it be described as a full pivot to the East?
SCO membership has shifted Iran’s foreign-policy balance toward an east-leaning orientation, though not in the form of a full pivot. It fits more accurately within a hedging strategy based on power balancing and calibrated diplomacy. Iran’s membership has brought about a mild strategic shift, what could be described as “East-prioritized”, but the need for diverse international relations means Tehran has kept the door to dialogue with the West open.
Given Western hostility and the growing influence of BRICS and the SCO, the balance has tilted more heavily toward the East, helping Iran break out of isolation without becoming wholly dependent. As a result, Iran has positioned itself as a bridge between East and West, maintaining European channels while deepening ties with China and Russia, thereby pushing back against Western hegemony. This membership allows Iran to avoid falling into a binary geopolitical trap and to benefit from a more nuanced recalibration of its strategic posture.