West targets Iran’s ...
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At present, Iran’s most important bargaining tool is providing or withholding access to the 400-plus kilograms of 60% enriched uranium reportedly buried under rubble. The agency, and specifically the United States, Europe, and of course Israel, place great importance on clarifying the fate of this material.
In fact, the main goal of the resolution is to push Iran to cooperate on granting access to this highly enriched uranium.
Can Russia and China actually prevent possible Western measures against Iran, or is their support largely symbolic?
What Russia and China can realistically do is prevent a resolution from being adopted by consensus. Also, they maintain limited nuclear cooperation with Iran, for example, Russia’s work on the Bushehr power plant, which is exempt from sanctions and acceptable to the agency.
However, within the Board of Governors, Moscow and Beijing’s hands are more tied than in the UN Security Council. The board does not grant veto power to the five permanent Security Council members or to NPT nuclear-weapon states. Compared with the snapback mechanism, their ability to hold off US initiatives is therefore more limited.
They could, for instance, propose a counter-resolution or rally Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states to their side. But these are political and diplomatic steps rather than concrete mechanisms for blocking Western action. Based on past experience, China and Russia cannot prevent a resolution from passing if it goes to a vote.
Given Iran’s coordination meetings with Russia, China, and the IAEA director general, can it be said that Tehran is seeking to build a support bloc against Western pressure? How effective could this approach be?
Yes, Iran is indeed trying to build up a support bloc. In previous years as well, Tehran used the Non-Aligned Movement and countries of the Global South to speak out in both the board and the Security Council and to push back against pressure.
But the reality is that the number and weight of the opposing bloc, the United States and Europe, remain greater. As the snapback episode demonstrated, their influence in both the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors is stronger.
What Iran can do is call into question the credibility of such resolutions. However, as mentioned earlier, even if adopted, this resolution is unlikely to lead to Iran’s file being referred to the Security Council. For that reason, Tehran is unlikely to show a sharp reaction.
At the same time, Iran may still refuse to grant access to the 60% enriched uranium, postponing such access until further agreements are reached with the United States, Europe, and the agency.