West targets Iran’s high-enriched uranium in IAEA bid
The upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, scheduled for November 19-21, carries particular significance for Iran. It will be the first session held after the expiry of Resolution 2231, meaning the board’s agenda will now revolve solely around the Safeguards framework, no longer Iran’s commitments under the JCPOA. The meeting also comes at a time when Iran-IAEA cooperation has been strained in the aftermath of the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict in June.
Iran’s reduction in engagement with the agency has alarmed Western countries, and reports suggest they intend to put forward a draft resolution against Iran at the upcoming board meeting. Tehran has warned that such a move would constitute yet “another big mistake” and would negatively affect prospects for cooperation with the IAEA.
Rahman Ghahremanpour, a foreign-policy analyst, believes Western pressure is primarily aimed at gaining access to Iran’s 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. However, he argues that even if adopted, the resolution will not lead to Iran’s case being referred to the UN Security Council.
IRAN DAILY: With Russia and China in support of Tehran, how likely is a Western-sponsored resolution to be adopted?
GHAHREMANPOUR: At the IAEA Board of Governors, decisions are taken by consensus. But if consensus cannot be reached on a proposed resolution, its sponsors can request a vote. In such cases, a resolution is adopted if it secures a majority, even though those passed by consensus carry more weight. When disagreements arise, voting is typically used.
Therefore, even if Russia and China push back, the United States and Europe would likely request a vote. Given the current composition of the board, a majority in favor of the resolution is certainly possible.
If the board adopts a resolution rebuking Iran, what options would Tehran have in response?
According to the information published so far, the resolution proposed by the European troika and the United States would call on Iran to increase its level of cooperation with the agency, grant access to the bombed nuclear facilities, namely Natanz, Fordow and the Isfahan UCF, and fulfil its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
The draft would also state that if Iran does not respond positively, the board will consider further measures at its next quarterly meeting. These could include referring a case of non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
As for Tehran’s options, Iran could scale back parts of its extra-safeguards or voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. Although cooperation has already decreased since the June attacks, Iran still maintains some level of engagement. But after the strikes on the three sites, Tehran’s leverage in terms of cooperation has largely diminished.
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