JCPOA remains alive with waned enforcement capacity
Iran has formally notified the UN Security Council that Resolution 2231, the legal backbone of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the six world powers, has expired.
Yet, Iran’s foreign minister on Tuesday insisted that while Resolution 2231 had run its course, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) itself is still alive. Abbas Araghchi argues that none of the five remaining parties – except the US – has officially withdrawn, and that Iran has only suspended its obligations rather than walked away from the accord, as certain articles continue to serve its interest, including the right to enrichment.
This raises a fundamental question: how can the JCPOA still be deemed alive when the resolution that endorsed it has lapsed? And do the remaining signatories share Tehran’s reading of the situation?
In an interview with Iran Daily, international affairs analyst Abed Akbari explains that the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 are legally distinct instruments. As a political agreement, he says, the JCPOA can survive independently of the Security Council’s endorsement, even though the loss of a binding international framework makes its implementation far more fragile.
IRAN DAILY: From the standpoint of international law, how can Resolution 2231 expire while the JCPOA is still considered valid?
AKBARI: From a legal perspective, we need to draw a line between two separate domains. First is the “Security Council resolution”, a decision adopted under the UN Charter, endowed with binding force and backed by international enforcement mechanisms. Second is the “multilateral political accord” – the JCPOA itself – an expression of the will of states that carries contractual and political weight but does not necessarily amount to a legally binding treaty under the Vienna Convention, nor does it automatically inherit all the binding effects of the council’s decision.
When a resolution expires, it simply means its own text or enforcement provisions set a time limit; once that period lapses, the council’s enforcement powers are no longer operative. But that does not automatically erase the JCPOA text. The agreement among the parties remains in place until they jointly decide to terminate, revoke, or halt its implementation.
So, while the expiration of the resolution ends the “UNSC-backed guarantees”, it does not by itself nullify the “contractual or political undertakings” of the JCPOA. In practice, this creates a hybrid situation: international enforcement tools such as UNSC-mandated sanctions or monitoring mechanisms cease to function, but the JCPOA’s technical core and substantive provisions, agreed upon by all parties, can still endure as a contractual norm, a set of technical standards, and a legal-political point of reference guiding the conduct of the signatories. In short, the council’s umbrella collapses, but the deal itself may linger on, although in a weakened and contestable form.
With the snapback mechanism triggered and UN sanctions reinstated, alongside Iran’s formal notice of Resolution 2231’s expiry, do the remaining parties still regard the JCPOA as alive or as a dead deal?
Politically speaking, the interpretations are divergent, even contradictory, so there’s no unified collective status of the deal. From a legal and practical standpoint, Western and European actors have invoked the resolution’s provisions and their reading of the snapback clause to justify reinstating certain sanctions and pressure. They argue that violations or threats to international peace can warrant the reimposition of restrictions.
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