Hamas response to Trump’s Gaza proposal, a step toward talks, not
The new peace plan, unveiled by US President Donald Trump with the stated aim of ending Israel’s bloody conflict in the Gaza Strip, lays out a package of proposals for a ceasefire, reconstruction of devastated areas, and the creation of channels for dialogue among the parties involved. Hamas, in a statement, welcomed some parts of the plan, describing it as a step toward easing the suffering of Gaza’s population.
Regional countries such as Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey have also thrown their weight behind the initiative, signaling readiness to act as mediators. With Gaza still grappling with the humanitarian and infrastructural fallout of the war, Trump’s plan could offer a fresh opportunity to get back to the negotiating table and launch a more durable path toward peace.
Nevertheless, since both sides express reservations about key provisions, the path to implementation remains riddled with uncertainties.
On this subject, Iran Daily spoke with Mohsen Faezi, a Palestinian affairs analyst.
IRAN DAILY: Given Hamas’s positive stance toward Trump’s proposed Gaza peace plan, how feasible is its full implementation?
FAEZI: Assuming Hamas’s response was positive—because Trump chose to read it that way—does not necessarily reflect the group’s actual position. The wording of Hamas’s reply was crafted so that Trump could interpret it as approval, but in reality, this has been Hamas’s standard tactic with every initiative over the past year. Virtually no plan has been flatly rejected; instead, Hamas has always said “yes, but…” followed by specific reservations.
With this strategy, Hamas managed to make Trump and others perceive its response as a step forward. Yet, the plan also included elements absent from earlier US rhetoric—most notably the acceptance of a Palestinian presence in Gaza. Only about six months ago, the talk was of forced displacement and even of setting up some sort of international administration in Gaza. But this plan rules out deportation altogether and defines a Palestinian state, albeit one placed under international oversight through what is now labeled the “Peace Council.”
Hamas deferred many key points to negotiations: how the state should be formed, how much independence Palestinians would actually have, and above all, the principle that “all decision-making about Palestine’s future must remain a Palestinian matter.” That single clause effectively crosses out half of Trump’s blueprint, sidelining much of what Washington proposed for supervising Gaza’s reconstruction and the governance of a Palestinian state, without directly mentioning them.
In other words, what has just begun is not the implementation of a peace plan but the start of a negotiation process. Hamas neither rejected the proposal outright nor accepted it wholesale. It left the door open by recognizing its positive aspects.
What potential obstacles lie ahead? Could Hamas’s refusal to disarm be a stumbling block?
The main issue is what kind of Palestinian governance Israel is willing to accept in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently argued—and from Israel’s perspective, not without logic—that any form of Palestinian statehood, whether emerging from the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, or even the so-called independents and technocrats mentioned in Trump’s plan, ultimately preserves Hamas’s influence. That means control over Gaza neighborhoods and, crucially, control over arms.
So, the central question is what the post-war state will look like. The clause in Trump’s plan about a Palestinian state monitored by a peace council does not seem likely to satisfy Israel. Even if the plan explicitly required Hamas to hand over its weapons to a new government, and even if Hamas accepts that, the reality on the ground would not change. With continued presence of arms in Gaza, Israel would inevitably fear a repeat of October 7.
The real dilemma is Israel’s own unresolved vision for Gaza’s future. For two years, it has struggled to come up with a viable alternative to Hamas, trying out different ideas but failing to find a substitute authority.
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