Will China and ...
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“This rupture would have consequences far beyond Iran,” Ghanbari warns. “If Council decisions lose credibility at the hands of certain major powers, the very legitimacy of the UN as the cornerstone of the post-war international order will be called into question. The Charter was written to resolve disputes between states, not to manage fractures among the great powers.”
That makes the current crisis a make-or-break test for the Council — one that could either restore its authority or fatally undermine it, heralding a new era in international relations.
Hard road back to ‘maximum pressure’
In this climate, observers argue that the recent votes laid bare more than just divisions. They underscored the emergence of a relatively cohesive bloc: Russia, China, Algeria and Pakistan lined up on one side, showing that their alignment could play a decisive role in more sensitive arenas, such as sanctions committees.
What makes this crucial is the decision-making rule: these bodies operate not by majority vote but by consensus, meaning even a single dissenting voice can block the path forward. Consequently, seemingly mundane and procedural matters — such as appointing a committee chair — could be brought to a standstill where the gentle demonstration of power, through a silent veto or calculated silence, proves far more effective than formal instruments.
The same logic applies to the expert panel established under Resolution 1929, designed to monitor sanctions implementation. Reviving this mechanism would require a collective decision of the Council — and just one “no” from Russia or China could pull the plug, leaving a body that could have acted as the Security Council's eyes and ears on the Iran file effectively confined to paper.
In the end, while Russia’s rotating presidency of the Council may not by itself bring sweeping changes, the strategic alignment of Moscow and Beijing at the committee level could tie Western ambitions in knots. It could make the road to restoring “maximum pressure” on Iran far bumpier — and far less certain — than many in the West had hoped.