Iran’s deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy answers
Will China and Russia’s silent veto paralyze UN sanctions?
By Maryam Salari
Staff writer
The UN Security Council recently witnessed one of the most fraught and decisive showdowns in recent memory. A draft resolution tabled by Russia and China to extend the expiration date of Resolution 2231 was blocked, failing to pass. For many observers, it was nothing less than the formal collapse of the Iran nuclear deal, even as Tehran doubled down on its position that triggering the so-called “snapback” mechanism was neither legally sound nor consistent with the spirit of the agreement — an accord that Western powers, by reneging on their commitments, had already pushed to the brink.
From Tehran’s perspective, the three European signatories forfeited the right to invoke such a mechanism, whose very purpose is predicated on the full compliance of all parties, the moment they failed to live up to their obligations. The legal and logical grounds for their claim, Iran argues, are shaky at best and logically speaking, highly questionable. Moscow and Beijing echoed this reasoning, sending a joint letter to the Security Council president on August 28. In it, they stressed that the European trio lacked any legal standing to set in motion the snapback process.
The letter went further, warning that any attempt to revive lapsed resolutions as binding measures would pull the rug out from under the legal foundations of global compliance. Consequently, the international community could no longer be expected to adhere to such enactments. In short, their message was stark: reinstated resolutions would command no universal legitimacy, and neither Russia nor China would feel bound to enforce them.
With Western members of the Council voting down the Russian-Chinese proposal to prolong the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Resolution 2231 by six months, the sanctions machinery has swung back into place. This raises a crucial question given the existing legal structures: what future lies ahead for the specialized committees and expert panels, set up under Paragraph 18 of Resolution 1737 and referenced in Resolution 1929, that were tasked with monitoring and implementing sanctions? And can Moscow and Beijing, as sitting members, throw a spanner in the works of decisions targeting states trading with Iran?
Disruption in
sanctions committees
Hamid Ghanbari, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy, paints a far more complex picture of how UN sanctions mechanisms operate than a first glance might suggest.
“Resolutions such as 1737 and 1929 embed their own enforcement structures,” he notes. “These often take the form of sanctions committees or expert panels, mandated not only to draw up initial lists of persons and entities subject to sanctions but also to monitor implementation and review those lists over time. In effect, the Security Council hands the keys to these committees to determine who should be penalized and how.”
“But the process does not stop there,” he adds. “Member states are required to file regular reports with these committees, spelling out the strengths, weaknesses and hurdles in implementing sanctions. These submissions become the raw material for committee deliberations, based on the consensus of the Council members and in the participation of representatives of the five major powers.”
He emphasizes that, in practice, the functioning of these bodies is contingent upon the will and cooperation of the Security Council’s permanent members. Here lies the rub. If China and Russia, both critical of Western approaches, withhold cooperation or reduce their involvement to a token presence, the machinery grinds to a halt.
“The wheels stop turning,” Ghanbari says. “Lists go out of date, decisions are delayed, and sanctions end up existing only on paper.”
Still, he cautions that “Western powers are well aware of this gap and are unlikely to sit on their hands. Proposals to establish a new coalition or a parallel committee are likely to be tabled—a mechanism that would operate without the participation of China and Russia.”
But such a move, as the diplomat warns, would crack the very foundations of international law. Any parallel mechanism would be the product of political alliances rather than a Security Council mandate — a precedent unseen in the UN’s 70-year history and potentially a dangerous turning point.
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