Sustaining permanent pressure on Tehran key Western policy
Window of diplomacy never closes: Expert
From the early hours of September 27, 2025, six previous UN Security Council resolutions that had been imposed on Iran due to its nuclear program were brought back into play at the international level through the European Troika’s exploitation of the dispute resolution (a.k.a. snapback) mechanism outlined in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA. Over the past few weeks, especially in recent days, Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, has been pulling out all the stops to prevent the reinstatement of these sanctions. Yet Iran’s efforts to keep the diplomatic window open — through negotiations with the European Troika, reaching an agreement to resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Cairo, and presenting constructive proposals on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly — failed to take off due to the alliance of the three European countries with the United States in resisting diplomacy. Just days ago, Iran’s foreign minister wrote in a letter to the UN secretary-general and Security Council president that the Islamic Republic firmly rejects the illegitimate reinstatement of the previously terminated resolutions under UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Iran emphasized that neither it nor any UN member state is forced to toe the line with such illegal measures. The crucial question among the Iranian public today is: What will the Islamic Republic do next after the re-imposition of resolutions suspended for 10 years following the JCPOA? To explore this, an interview with international relations expert Ali Nasri has been conducted, and its translation follows:
Given that it had become clear weeks ago that Tehran’s actions held no sway with Europe and that the European Troika was determined to push forward with the snapback, what were the goals of these three European countries?
NASRI: The goal of the UK, France, and Germany in activating the snapback mechanism is to carry on the pressure campaign against Iran in tandem with the United States and under the influence of the Zionist lobby. Despite being fully aware of Iran’s efforts to preserve the JCPOA and engage with the IAEA, these countries want to keep their leverage in play and continuously force Iran into a tug-of-war to escape this predicament.
Europe, through this, tries to make a comeback on the international stage as its influence wanes, aiming to save itself from becoming irrelevant in international affairs. So, also at the same time, through biased narratives, it aims to place the blame for the JCPOA’s failure squarely on Iran.
There may still be questions about Tehran’s actions and whether the necessary steps were taken to prevent the return of the resolutions. In your view, were Iran’s confidence-building measures sufficient?
Iran’s confidence-building measures were both sufficient and went beyond JCPOA obligations. As our foreign minister pointed out at the UN Security Council meeting, the US unilaterally pulled out of the JCPOA once after negotiations and then twice launched military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations. Europe not only failed to uphold its commitments under the JCPOA but also either implicitly or explicitly supported Israel’s aggressions against Iranian soil and nuclear sites.
Even Germany’s chancellor described Israel’s actions as Europe’s “dirty work”. Despite these provocations, Iran kept its cool, choosing the diplomatic path and striking a deal with the IAEA in Cairo to ease the impact of sanctions on the country’s economy and people.
Unfortunately, the European trio did not match Iran’s good faith with their own. It’s vital to highlight this reality for the global public and especially for the Iranian people. Foreign policy should be viewed through a national lens, not through party lines. Fueling internal divisions and finger-pointing distracts from the true culprits — the real deal-breakers and architects of the “maximum pressure” policy — and escalates domestic tensions. While analyzing its policies, Iran must remember that on the nuclear issue, the main responsibility lies first with the Trump administration, which is under Zionist lobby pressure, and then with the E3.
What is the next diplomatic step and the possible scenarios ahead? Can the phrase “the diplomatic window remains open” still be used?
In foreign policy, the diplomatic window never closes, and the country’s Foreign Ministry is tasked with continuously seeking out new paths to peacefully resolve disputes. However, in the current situation, the priority should not be to take the initiative for talks with the West. The foreign minister has also previously stated that if UN sanctions return, Europe’s role in the nuclear file will diminish considerably.
Iran’s next diplomatic moves could focus on domestic and regional capabilities, while delegitimizing illegal US and European actions in public opinion and international legal forums. At critical junctures, even withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could be considered — not as a military threat, but to return to the negotiation table — though this is a double-edged sword that requires utmost caution and consideration of all consequences. Another crucial step is narrative-building to effectively explain to the international community that “dignity” is one of the key pillars of Iran’s foreign policy.
Iran remains willing to engage in dialogue, cooperation, and constructive interaction in its nuclear and foreign policy issues, but this engagement must be based on respect. Iran will not back down under pressure, but in an atmosphere of respect, it is ready to talk and cooperate.
Since the US welcomed the re-imposition of UN sanctions, possibly as a way to return to the process it left in 2018, will Tehran’s willingness to negotiate meet with a positive response from the White House?
Regarding the US, one must consider various factions involved in shaping its foreign policy. Even sanctions as a tool do not have a single unified purpose in their political structure. One faction, influenced by the Zionist lobby, may view sanctions as part of a “hybrid war” — an economic war alongside psychological/media warfare aimed at stirring internal instability or paving the way for military action. Another faction sees sanctions mainly as leverage to maximize gains in negotiations.
Understanding these differences is essential for Iran to adjust its strategy. Iran needs to know which mindset it is dealing with and tailor its responses and policies accordingly.
The interview first appeared in Persian on IRNA.