What comes next after snapback?
By Kiumars Ashtarian
Professor of public policy
After the “snapback,” the next move by the US and Israel is to bring Iran under Article 42, officially labeling Iran a “threat to international peace and security” by the United Nations Security Council. In this way, Israel is looking to not only rope in the US but also drag others into a war against Iran. Whereas previously the “nuclear ambiguity” posed no immediate threat, now stepping up enrichment or pulling out of the NPT is effectively embarking down this path.
Some political activists believe that a meeting between Pezeshkian and Trump could have unlocked a solution amid the current tense situation. This belief has several bases: a well-known one is that Trump is a narcissistic, business-minded person you can strike a deal with.
But over time, it has become clear that these two traits haven’t opened up any clear opportunities for any country, including Iran. Trump prefers to put people and countries on the spot in public humiliation, and he will definitely treat Iran’s representative the same. These activists also believed that Trump wants to cut a deal, but it is Iran that is standing firm. Another premise is that Trump is the sole master of the game, and global power dynamics play a lesser role.
These assumptions are seriously flawed. Meeting Trump without solid political-military backing cannot turn the tide. Of course, expert negotiations in general are not a red line that must never be crossed.
On the other hand, Europe set three conditions to ward off the snapback: no acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, transparency around previously-enriched uranium, and negotiations with the US. Legal mechanisms around the first two are clear, but the third is an “open-ended text,” meaning it suspends the matter to an uncertain issue. This is exactly the ambiguity, bad faith, and deception in Europe’s offer as talking to the US carries no clear proposal. No specific topic has even been set. The US can put anything on the table, and as soon as Iran refuses, they say Iran hasn’t accepted the third condition, thereby implementing the snapback. This, in itself, is a new mechanism in the same vein as that infamous snapback.
I have always said that in such cases, Iran must clearly lay down its own conditions, and if there are common grounds, it must lay them out straight as well. Saying that “the condition for holding negotiations is a US guarantee not to attack” is insufficient. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani said that the West demands Iran’s missile range be scaled back to under 500 kilometers. Although unofficial, this demand poses a serious threat that would leave Iran exposed without missile defense and within Israel’s reach. Israel pursues a “divine mission” to expand “to the Euphrates”. As a former US assistant defense secretary put it, this is a comprehensive strategic plan aimed at weakening Iran’s sovereignty, toppling the regime, and then fragmenting the country.
Now, Iran holds the key to the conquest of the Middle East and thus must be ground down. The power play, made by the US and Israel, is based on weakening and destroying Iran, and if their estimates show they can knock Iran flat with war in the short term, they will surely pull the trigger. This “comprehensive plan” isn’t up to Trump or Netanyahu’s whim but rather a strategic matter — though these two happen to be the right players at the right moment for such a historic opportunity.
This power game also has a social structure dimension: The Gaza war showed that Israel’s “society” — essentially a large barracks — is deeply sick and a majority supports Gaza’s massacre. In the US as well, a religious social body backs Trump. All this shows Trump is not alone; He represents a social base, an international power structure, a historical-cultural background, and an American economic platform. So, resolving the crisis isn’t just up to Trump’s personal will, though he is an important actor.
It is the US that doesn’t care about resolving the conflict and has effectively shut all doors; Even if Iran agrees to scale enrichment to 3.5% or even zero, it won’t even get empty promises of sanction relief. We might think this crisis shouldn’t have gotten this far. That is true and regrettable, but it doesn’t justify thinking that a “meeting” on its own could have worked wonders.
For now, there’s no choice but to hold onto missile power while pushing hard diplomatically to avoid war. I have said we must not put ourselves on the buffalo’s horn. Yes, but sometimes the wild buffalo won’t back down from you. They are determined to destroy and divide Iran and will surely kick off their chaos again through assassinations. I have previously talked about necessary measures. A key takeaway is that the pressures from the US and Israel bear no relation to the end of Reformism or the end of a Reformist government in Iran. Is Reformism about surrender and humiliation before foreigners? The stance of some political activists, Reformists and others, reveals a simplistic view of international relations.
Clearly, scaling back missile range means total surrender and raises the risk of war. Clearly, pressures from the US and Israel make no sense internationally. Clearly, resolving this crisis right now has nothing to do with the Reformist or Principalist nature of Iran’s government, nor even a neutral government. Even if someone like al-Jolani comes to power in Iran, Israel’s first move would be to wipe out Iran’s military infrastructure. This conflict has nothing to do with Reformism’s decline, though this government is more a mix of non-political figures than a Reformist government. Reformism must be seen in a historical continuum, not a temporary matter unrelated to any Iranian political forces.
The article first appeared in the Persian-language newspaper Shargh.