Tehran’s strategy as sanctions loom
By M.A. Mokarrami
Journalist, commentator
If last-minute diplomatic efforts fail and the “snapback” mechanism is triggered in the coming days, Iran will once again face the return of comprehensive international sanctions. The central question now is how Tehran should respond to manage both the nuclear issue and the economic and security repercussions of renewed restrictions.
Recent developments show that Iran will not be easily coerced. Its conduct during the 12-day war with Israel highlighted a determination to resist pressure and preserve sovereignty. For Tehran, resilience and deterrence are not optional but central to its strategic doctrine. In the aftermath of that conflict, strengthening defense capabilities and rebuilding deterrence remain crucial. By enhancing its military preparedness and reinforcing national unity, Iran aims to ensure that the threat of military escalation does not weaken its position. Should hostilities resume, it is unlikely that Tehran would retreat under pressure, preferring instead to demonstrate that coercion cannot achieve what diplomacy fails to deliver.
On the nuclear front, Iran’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency remains a delicate but necessary component of its broader strategy. Western powers will likely attempt to use the nuclear program as the main justification for tightening sanctions. Yet Tehran has the option of maintaining cooperation within new frameworks, thereby denying its adversaries the chance to escalate the dispute. By continuing interaction with the agency, Iran can emphasize the peaceful nature of its program and signal that it is not seeking confrontation over transparency. Such an approach could blunt some of the diplomatic momentum behind the sanctions push.
The most pressing challenge, however, lies in the economic dimension. The return of sanctions is expected to trigger immediate shocks, ranging from market volatility and inflation to the outflow of capital. Iran’s past experience in managing similar crises suggests that rapid action can mitigate the worst effects. Stabilizing the national currency, protecting key supply chains, and curbing speculative behavior will be essential steps. If Tehran can absorb the initial impact and restore confidence, the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of pressure will diminish significantly. The lesson of earlier sanction cycles is clear: the first weeks are the most dangerous, but they can also set the tone for resilience.
International partnerships will play a decisive role in this process. Both China and Russia have opposed the activation of the snapback mechanism and are well positioned to dilute its practical impact. Their involvement in technical committees, enforcement mechanisms, and economic arrangements could reduce the sanctions’ bite.
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