A reflection on ...
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Failure to secure a majority in favor of extending the suspension of sanctions amounts, under Resolution 2231, to a continuation of the “no decision” state. This is a necessary condition for snapback but not a sufficient one. For the mechanism to be triggered, the no decision status must last the full 30 days. Paragraph 12 makes this clear: If the Security Council has not adopted a resolution under Paragraph 11 to continue the sanctions relief in Paragraph 7(a), then, after the 30th day following the notification, at midnight GMT, the provisions of Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929 shall apply again in the same manner as before the adoption of Resolution 2231.
From these legal premises, at least two conclusions can be drawn. First, the process of snapback is still ongoing, and September 28 will be the day of its enforcement, whether or not the procedural resolution raised on Friday passes (because Resolution 2231 explicitly names no decision as the necessary condition for snapback). Second, given that the continuation of the no decision status for the 30-day window is also the sufficient condition, there remains about one week for diplomacy — even if that opportunity is merely theoretical. In fact, any permanent or non-permanent member of the Council that is also a JCPOA participant could, through a political deal struck outside the chamber, introduce a draft resolution to extend Resolution 2231 and thus block snapback, even one minute before the deadline at midnight GMT on the 30th day.
The final point is this: the odds of snapback not being provoked are, based on overwhelming political evidence, a formal possibility, not a practical one. But it cannot be overlooked that the pre-2231 resolutions were passed at a time of consensus among the global powers. Just this past Friday, however, Russia, China, Algeria, and Pakistan voted in favor of South Korea’s procedural resolution to extend Iran’s sanctions relief. This underscores that the reinstated resolutions will return in a very different political climate than when they were first adopted, and they will be enforced amid far more complex global dynamics.
For Iran, the costs of their return are inevitable. Yet those costs, compared with the earlier period, and the world’s shift into an era of great powers’ rivalry, are likely to be capped at a lower threshold.