A reflection on legal concept of snapback
By Hadi Khosroshahin
Editor-in-chief
of Iran newspaper
On September 19, Iranian media outlets were filled with headlines that bore little resemblance to the legal reality of Resolution 2231 that enshrined the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). Phrases such as “Back to square one,” “Security Council votes for return of sanctions,” or “Draft to lift sanctions fails at Security Council” dominated the media. The underlying and sometimes explicit message of such headlines was a mistaken emphasis on the instigation of the “snapback” mechanism — whereas no such conclusion can be drawn from the provisions of Resolution 2231.
Paragraphs 9 through 12 of the resolution draw a clear distinction between the process of snapback and its actual activation. A lack of attention to this distinction appears to have led to several misleading headlines splashed across print and online media.
A core provision of this resolution is that the snapback mechanism hinges on two key conditions: “no decision on the continuation of lifting UN sanctions against Iran,” and “the continuation of no decision for a 30-day period”. Put differently, the snapback mechanism remains at the procedural stage without these two conditions being met and does not cross over into the realm of implementation.
Another important aspect is the starting point of the process, which begins the moment member states claim Iran has violated its JCPOA commitments. That starting point was triggered on August 28, when the European troika submitted its complaint against Iran to the Security Council. Hence, the 30-day countdown began then. While the vote on Friday’s draft resolution covered the first condition, it fails to meet the second — the 30-day timeframe.
What happened on Friday at the Security Council fell under Paragraph 11 of Resolution 2231. This paragraph states that upon receiving a notification from a JCPOA participant about significant non-performance of commitments, the Security Council shall vote within 30 days on a draft resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions in paragraph 7(a) of Resolution 2231. If no member of the Council has submitted such a draft resolution within 10 days of the notification, the President of the Security Council shall do so and put it to a vote within 30 days.
That is what unfolded in New York on Friday: the Council voted on a draft resolution introduced by South Korea, as the rotating president, in line with Paragraph 11. The move was procedural, not substantive, and was based on the Yalta voting model — nine votes in favor without veto power. The aim was to prevent the automatic initiation of snapback at the close of the 30th day. Yet the effort failed after nine members opposed it.
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