Iran should use 30-day diplomatic window to block snapback
By Mohsen Abdollahi
Legal scholar
The three European members of Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA)—France, Germany, and Britian, known as the E3—have announced their decision to trigger the “snapback” mechanism, once again pushing the calculations surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and the future of the deal into a new phase. Their move, which in practice could pave the way for the reinstatement of all UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, carries major political, economic, and diplomatic implications while posing fresh challenges for Tehran.
Once the snapback is instigated, a 30-day countdown begins during which the Security Council must decide whether sanctions will be reimposed. During this window, a round of negotiations is expected to take place, meaning the diplomatic channel remains open.
Although Russia and China support Iran’s position and may deliver strong statements in support of Tehran, neither will have a decisive impact on the process, given that Panama holds the Council presidency through August and South Korea takes over in September—both countries widely viewed as aligned with US interests. Thus, the matter ultimately hinges on Iran’s willingness to extend the snapback deadline, which expires in October, and head off the return of sanctions until a compromise can be found.
Iran should seize this opportunity to advance negotiations. Should progress be made, a resolution could be passed to extend the JCPOA timeframe by two to six months, thereby giving diplomacy more breathing room. Iran should not allow sanctions to return and then attempt to push through a resolution halting their enforcement, since that would prove far more complex and difficult.
It is true that the return of UN sanctions does not directly target Iran’s oil, gas, petrochemical, banking, or financial sectors. Rather, the bulk of these resolutions impose restrictions on military and nuclear industries, especially arms sales, while calling on governments to closely monitor Iranian transactions and shipments to ensure they are not diverted to nuclear or missile programs.
Although these resolutions, in effect, do not create new direct economic sanctions, they still act as a booster to US and EU unilateral measures, which by themselves have already proven far tougher than the five UN resolutions. If sanctions are reinstated, Iran’s room for maneuver will tighten slightly, and Washington will cash in on this by ramping up pressure on countries still engaged in trade with Tehran.
As a result, even if direct financial and trade barriers are not immediately imposed, the cost and risk of doing business with Iran would rise.
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