Iran’s expectation that ...
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Even modest actions, if well‑intentioned, would have a positive ripple effect. As close partners with full insight into Iran’s peaceful nuclear pursuits, they could serve as its spokespersons and help manage the crisis. Iran’s expectations are not misplaced—they are reasonable—and it is hoped these nations will honor their international responsibilities, even to preserve their own reputations.
Given their permanent seats on the UN Security Council, and the global impact of the 12-day war, it was expected that Russia and China would step forward with meaningful initiatives. Iran exercised restraint, avoiding aggressive actions, and the conflict did not cause major disruption to global energy or oil markets. Yet China—by far the most affected by energy market disruption—could have done more. Their contributions should go beyond issuing blanket statements; they require solid legal foundations rooted in UN or IAEA documents. For example, since the JCPOA permits uranium enrichment by Iran at 3.67%, any proposal should be anchored in verified UN-backed frameworks and backed by practical measures—such as dispatching special envoys. The inaction of Russia and China, especially given their track record in mediation, was therefore perplexing.
There is no formal documentation to suggest that Russia or China oppose Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities. In fact, both reap rewards—Russia is completing one nuclear reactor in Iran and building two more, and China has the capacity to take part. Their nuclear engagement in Iran is thus in their interest. The existing ambiguity about their stance on Iran’s nuclear program likely stems from their lack of initiative following the US departure from the JCPOA. Transparent involvement from them would have dispelled these doubts.
In today’s precarious ceasefire, with ongoing threats from Israel and the US, China’s cautious approach and reluctance to offer military support to Iran are unsurprising. Even if arms deals exist, robust cooperation demands stability, clear contracts, and transparent trade mechanisms. Moreover, overreliance on just one or two nations—like China or Russia—could leave Iran vulnerable.
Iran’s pre‑Revolution industrial infrastructure was largely supplied by Europe, with deep collaboration involving European firms. Those ties have weakened, but they must be a priority in talks with the JCPOA’s powerful European signatories. Sole dependence on China or Russia could restrict Iran’s economic and political room for maneuver.
Domestic self-reliance has helped Iran in certain areas, but it remains inadequate. Accordingly, Iran needs to spread out its supply channels and avoid overreliance on any single partner. This broader strategy would empower Tehran to bargain from a position of strength in international dealings, shielding itself from undue economic and political pressure. Iranian officials must shape their policies accordingly to safeguard national interests.