A look back at Zionism’s history, penetration strategy in Iran
Zionists pushed Iran infiltration since Nakba: Expert
The so-called 12-day war marks the first direct and conventional military confrontation between Iran and Israel since the establishment of the Zionist regime in 1948, a span of 77 years. Up until the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the two countries were close allies. However, the Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic drove a deep wedge between them, both ideologically and politically. The revolution’s rallying cry of “defending the rights of the Palestinian people and liberating Al-Quds” stood in stark contrast to the Zionist vision of establishing and maintaining a Jewish state, known as Israel, in Palestine. Despite mounting tensions over the years, Iran and Israel had steered clear of direct confrontation. Iran, for its part, threw its weight behind resistance groups in Palestine and the region, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the Zionist regime set up spy networks, carried out assassinations of Iranian scientists, and took steps against Iran’s national security. The 12-day war, however, heralded a new chapter in the standoff between Iran and Israel. It now appears that both sides are on a collision course, with direct military confrontation looming. Signs of this shift began to emerge a few months earlier, on October 7, 2023, when resistance forces led by Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel. This assault left many Israelis dead or captured and dealt a heavy blow to Israel’s deterrence. Roughly 20 months after that incident, the occupying regime, which had long beat the drums of war under the pretext of ending Iran’s (peaceful) nuclear program, finally carried out a surprise operation on June 13, 2025 (amid ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and the US), targeting several of Iran’s military and nuclear sites. If we set aside the deception and blatant violations of international law by the US and the Zionist regime — especially in striking Iran right in the middle of nuclear negotiations — the simultaneous assassination of several scientists and military commanders, using equipment that had been brought in and operated through infiltration, speaks volumes about the Zionists’ years-long efforts to spy on and infiltrate various sectors in Iran. In this context, Iran Daily sat down with Shadab Asgari, a writer, contemporary historian, and military affairs expert, for an in-depth discussion, the full text of which follows:
By Sadeq Dehqan
Staff writer
IRAN DAILY: It seems the recent war reflects Israel’s intelligence penetration into various sectors and the execution of a long-term plan to attack Iran. As a historian, what is your take on the roots and depth of Zionist infiltration in Iran?
ASGARI: That’s correct. When the Zionists themselves and American military experts admit that the regime spent 20 years planning this operation, it’s clear they had long-term plans to worm their way into Iran’s intelligence apparatus. It would be naïve to think Israel’s infiltration only sprang up in recent years.
To get to the bottom of Zionist espionage in Iran, we need to turn back the clock and look at history. The first Jewish activities in Iran date back to 1898, when a representative from the Jewish organization Alliance Israélite Universelle came to Iran, met with Mozaffar ad-Din Shah, and, by offering money and resources, secured permission to open the first branch of their schools in Tehran.
This school was established in Tehran in 1900. In the years that followed, similar schools sprang up in Iranian cities like Hamedan, Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Bijar, Nahavand, Tuyserkan, Borujerd, Isfahan, Yazd, and Kashan. These schools operated under the direct supervision of the Alliance’s headquarters in Paris.
Notably, due to their pro-Jewish nature, the prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri was staunchly opposed to their establishment in Iran. Among the notable alumni of the Alliance schools was Lieutenant General Ali Razmara, a top military commander during the Pahlavi era and a fierce opponent of the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. He famously questioned, “How can Iranians who cannot even make a pitcher hope to nationalize the oil industry?” This shows the kind of mindset these schools turned out.
Zionism in Iran, according to some theories, was formally established in 1910 by a group of young Jews in Hamedan. The first Zionist newspaper, “Shalom,” edited by Mordechai Shalom, was launched on March 21, 1915. In 1919, with the Balfour Declaration commemoration, the Zionist organization officially announced its presence across Iran. Interestingly, their first congress in Iran took place on March 26, 1921 — less than two months after Reza Khan’s coup, which toppled the Qajar government and paved the way for the Pahlavi dynasty.
After declaring their presence in Iran, the Zionists sent their charter to the foreign ministry and Jamshid Jam, the then-foreign minister of Iran, and established contact with him. Jam, in October 1920, took out a hefty loan of 500,000 tomans from the British Imperial Bank and handed it to a Baháʼí named Sho’a’ollah Alaei, then a treasury employee, instructing him to pass the funds on to the Cossack forces in western Iran so they could make their way to Tehran for the coup. There is ample evidence that Baháʼís and Jews played a part in Reza Shah’s rise to power.
The first — and perhaps only — Jewish doctor in Reza Khan’s administration was Colonel Dr. Habib Levy, who headed up the dental service for both Reza Shah and the army. Dr. Levy, from a very wealthy family, worked closely with the World Jewish Agency and played a crucial role in moving Jews from Iran and Afghanistan to Palestine. His son, Zion, joined the terrorist group, Haganah, and was actively involved in the massacre of Palestinians and the occupation of their land. As a result, a building and a street in Tel Aviv bear his name in recognition of his actions.
In 1958, Mossad’s Zaytoun network was established in Iran, with three main branches in the provinces of Khuzestan, Ilam, and Kurdistan. These branches were tasked with recruiting allies in Iran. Meir Ezri, Israel’s ambassador and first plenipotentiary in Tehran, as well as Israel’s military attaché in Iran, kept in touch with Israeli intelligence agencies and passed on information freely, never once being questioned by the Iranian secret police SAVAK.
Moreover, from 1963 onward, when the US and UK pulled out of SAVAK, and under Hassan Pakravan’s leadership, control of SAVAK effectively fell into Israeli hands. Even when Israel was still only recognized de facto and not by most countries, senior Iranian military commanders such as General Bahram Aryana, General Fereydoun Jam, and General Gholamreza Azhari — the highest-ranking officers after Mohammad Reza Shah — paid visits to Israel. All of this shows just how far back the Zionists’ plans to penetrate Iran go, and how the Islamic Revolution dealt a major blow to their ambitions.
Let’s move forward and dig into the reasons behind Israel’s infiltration in Iran in recent years.
I already touched on the roots of Zionist penetration in Iran in the previous question. What I want to make clear is that their infiltration is nothing new. For years, they laid the groundwork to make inroads not only in Iran but also in Afghanistan and other countries, all to further their own agenda in the area.
The subsequent actions of the US in the region have also played into their hands. We saw in 2021 how the US struck a deal with the Taliban and effectively handed over Afghanistan to them. As a result, a flood of Afghans, claiming to be under Taliban pressure, poured into Iran. Some of them, under Zionist influence, got involved in recent events. My point is, the Zionists have always kept their eyes on infiltrating Islamic countries to push through their objectives.
We also shouldn’t gloss over the role of the Baháʼís in Iran. Most of the Zionist infiltration after the Revolution has been carried out by Baháʼís, who have essentially acted as their operatives within Iran. Their role in the unrest of 2009 has been well established. These individuals have taken an active part in identifying and recruiting infiltrators. Currently, tens of thousands of Baháʼís live in Iran, and many have been led to believe that, for their own safety, they must hand over information about their surroundings to foreign intelligence services. As a result, Baháʼís have been systematically and indirectly steered toward gathering security information in Iran. This isn’t something new or unique to the recent war. In the past, whenever Zionists had a stake, these individuals carried out intelligence and espionage activities — for example, in the early days after the Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War, many of these infiltrators in the army and the IRGC of Kermanshah Province spied for the Zionists.
You mentioned the historical roots of infiltration in previous years. Why, despite knowing this background, have we been caught off guard by infiltrators in recent times?
In my view, addressing this issue simply wasn’t high on our list of threats in previous years, and we let many people slip through the cracks who could have fallen into the enemy’s trap. We didn’t see them as a potential threat. Now, it’s clear that some individuals and groups, as mentioned, have been caught red-handed building quadcopters, military equipment, and operating them.
But saying this doesn’t mean we should crack down on everyone. In Iran, we haven’t treated minorities and migrant groups this way, and we won’t in the future. However, we must keep a close eye on areas vulnerable to enemy intelligence infiltration.
As for the Afghans, their recent return to their home country boils down to one reason: Their stay in Iran was illegal. So, we shouldn’t tie their departure to the recent conflict. Of course, during the recent war, some Afghans may have been arrested for collaborating with Zionists, and their cooperation with the enemy may have been proven. But this doesn’t mean we should tar them all with the same brush. Such actions would be a security blunder as the enemy is out to undermine our unity and stir up tensions within. Therefore, if Afghan migrants have entered the country illegally, they should be deported, but we must not blame an entire ethnicity for these issues.
Another point to mention regarding infiltration is the role of cyberspace. Some people online are chasing quick money and large sums. When faced with lucrative offers, they may fall for the bait. The enemy starts by asking them to do simple things — like “take a photo of a certain place” in exchange for good money — but then ropes them into more serious tasks and tries to shut the door on their return. For instance, they might be asked to insult the Qur’an and send a video as proof.
How deep do you think enemy infiltration goes, given their ability to assassinate military and security figures with such precision?
The exact level of enemy infiltration is hard to pin down because we’re not privy to all aspects of the matter. What is clear is that we have had intelligence gaps in some areas and have sometimes dropped the ball. For example, quadcopters had been built inside the country and ended up in enemy hands. These centers were under observation, but there wasn’t focused oversight — two organizations were supposed to keep tabs on them at the same time, and this overlap led to lapses in monitoring. On top of that, some individuals — both known and unknown — fell under enemy influence and deviated, and we didn’t pick up on it. But even if such incidents have occurred, it doesn’t mean infiltration has reached a massive scale or that there’s been an intelligence disaster. In fact, it is possible that many security cases have been handled, and many people have been arrested, but these matters haven’t been made public for security and national interests.
Also, we shouldn’t assume the enemy must always dig deep into our security centers to learn the whereabouts of commanders and key figures. Sometimes, this information falls into enemy hands through the public: A rumor about someone’s arrest or assassination makes the rounds, relatives or acquaintances check in on the person, and the news gets back to the enemy. Failing to observe security protocols — so-called “speech protection” — also lets information slip through the cracks. The enemy can also hack phones, listen in on calls, and tap into social and online communications. With AI, satellite images, and facial recognition, they can also zero in on targets.
But all this doesn’t mean the enemy has the upper hand in intelligence. In fact, we should talk about our own intelligence dominance over the enemy. In a country like Israel, where most of the population is trained in military and security matters, we have had such a grip on their security and intelligence centers that we have struck them with pinpoint missile attacks.