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Europeans are poised to initiate the snapback of sanctions by the end of August, aiming to reinforce their status and influence in Iran’s nuclear case and to secure their role as mediators and negotiating partners.
Activating the snapback mechanism does not strip Europe of its means to play a role in nuclear negotiations. On the contrary, it can be said that this move is part of the European strategy to maintain their position in the nuclear diplomacy process. From Iran’s perspective, the legal interpretation of Europe’s post‑JCPOA conduct becomes paramount. Tehran might argue that, just as the United States ceased to be a JCPOA party after withdrawing in 2018, Europe—by failing to uphold its commitments—has effectively stepped out of the agreement, though not formally. If such reasoning prevails, Iran may no longer consider Europe a legitimate partner in the JCPOA and could consequently challenge the legitimacy of their activation of the snapback mechanism.
Another interpretation suggests Iran may still consider the EU a JCPOA participant and view snapback as little more than a political bargaining chip, rather than a break in the agreement’s framework. If that is the case, snapback could instead serve to boost Europe’s leverage in nuclear diplomacy—especially if all parties seek a middle path neither involving full UNSC sanctions reinstatement nor the JCPOA’s collapse under UNSCR 2231.
Should Europe fail to act decisively, it will still lack leverage once the JCPOA deadline expires. Thus, the trio might provoke snapback to apply managed pressure on Iran while keeping channels of dialogue open. One proposal on the table calls for a one‑year extension of the snapback timeframe—an opportunity to roll out fresh diplomacy, reopen talks, and keep the agreement or explore a revised deal .
Judging by Europe’s August deadline for snapback activation, the objective appears less about reimposing Security Council sanctions and more about exerting political pressure to secure concessions from Tehran, and re‑engage in nuclear negotiations from which Europe has largely receded in recent months.
If a realist lens is applied, Europe’s preferred outcome is not escalating pressure but redefining its role in nuclear diplomacy. Extending the snapback within UNSCR 2231 could offer that vehicle. This suggests Europe has not abandoned its multilateral norms and diplomacy, but rather continues to pursue an active mediation role albeit while employing pressure tactics as part of this strategy.