US seeks to resolve nuclear standoff via diplomacy
By Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi
Professor of international relations
As the sixth round of talks between Iran and the United States approaches, uncertainty looms over whether it will take place at all. There are several possible reasons for the delay. Although five rounds of negotiations have already been held—with the most recent ending in statements saying that both sides had reached a better understanding of each other’s positions—it seems that deep-seated disagreements still persist.
The bone of contention remains Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Since 2003, Iran’s stance on this issue has remained consistent. Its red line has always been the continuation of enrichment on Iranian soil. Iran insists on its right to enrichment, while showing a willingness to accept, on a voluntary basis, additional monitoring commitments under clear frameworks. On the other hand, the current American stance pushes for “zero enrichment.” There now appears to be a consensus within the US political establishment in opposition to any form of enrichment in Iran.
The failure to launch a sixth round suggests that mediators who attempted to bridge the gap between the two sides have fallen short. At least three compromise proposals had been put forward. The first suggested a temporary suspension of enrichment in exchange for halting new US sanctions. The second proposed the creation of an enrichment consortium, which reportedly failed due to its stipulation that enrichment take place outside of Iran. The third was a hybrid proposal: limited enrichment inside Iran to meet domestic needs—such as for the Tehran reactor—combined with an international consortium. None of these proposals has yielded results. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that Iran will show readiness to enter the sixth round, and it will probably respond in writing instead.
When the military option is mentioned in the American discourse, what is likely being referred to is limited, targeted strikes on nuclear facilities. Yet the suspension of negotiations does not necessarily signal a shift toward military action. It may instead reflect continued efforts to pursue each side’s interests outside the formal negotiation framework. Iran, too, has been engaging through intermediaries to respond to American proposals. If negotiations officially collapse and diplomacy hits a dead end, the possibility of pinpoint strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities increases—but that does not mean Iran would be unprepared. It seems that Iran, guided by a power-based approach, has planned for various scenarios.
In the event of such targeted attacks, it is likely that the United States would delegate it to Israel, allowing it to carry out a proxy operation. Even so, the military option is a costly one for the US. Iran would almost certainly hit back, and that response could damage US bases across the region.
More importantly, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities could prompt Iran to reconsider its nuclear doctrine and its membership in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This could lead to strategic ambiguity or even a formal withdrawal from the treaty—though that would not necessarily mean Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons.
In the end, the military option offers the US minimal benefit at maximal cost. Washington’s goal is to halt or dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, but military strikes would not achieve that aim. Analysts believe such attacks would not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities; they would only inflict temporary damage.
Thus, the US continues to prioritize resolving the nuclear issue through diplomacy—but with the intention of securing a deal that is, in its view, both maximalist and desirable.
The full article appeared in Persian on IRNA.