Senior Army commander:
Iran stood alone in Iraqi-imposed war
Saddam enjoyed support from 36 countries
Iranians have all heard the tales of the bravery and sacrifice of their soldiers during the Iraqi-imposed war on Iran countless times. However, the voluminous book of the Holy Defense era still holds many unread and unheard pages — a book whose every line is filled with numerous major and minor events, carrying invaluable experiences and lessons. The eight-year imposed war, with all its hardships, bitterness, and destruction, came to an end — thanks to the sacrifices of thousands of martyred, wounded, captured, and missing soldiers — without even an inch of our country’s soil falling into the hands of the Ba’athist enemy. The events of that era were recorded as a proud and memorable document in the long history of this land. Nearly 36 years have passed since the end of the imposed war, yet we can still hear narratives and untold stories from the warriors who were at the heart of those events. By analyzing these accounts, we can uncover new and educative points that have remained sealed until now. Brigadier General Masoud Bakhtiari is a retired military officer, university lecturer, and historian of the war who was one of the senior commanders of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army during the Iran-Iraq War. Due to his close association with Major General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, then-commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army’s Ground Forces, he was called upon to collaborate in his headquarters from the early months of the war. Thus, he played a role in planning and commanding major victorious operations such as Beit al-Moqaddas and Tariq al-Quds. Given his effective and prolonged presence on the frontlines and in operations, General Bakhtiari is the black box of many operations and events of the imposed war. Today, he teaches his experiences from the eight-year war in the form of military lessons to future commanders of the Army in this exclusive interview with Iran Daily.
By Sadeq Dehqan
Staff writer
IRAN DAILY: First, could you kindly provide a brief biography and combat history in your own words?
GENERAL BAKHTIARI: I am a retired brigadier general of Iran’s Ground Forces with about 42 years of service in various branches of the Army. I was born in Tehran in 1941. I entered the Officers’ Academy at 18, graduating three years later in 1962. I then progressed through various scientific and combat ranks in different units of the Army in Iran and completed my advanced studies and military courses, like many pre-Revolution military personnel, in the US. Since retirement, I have served as a professor and faculty member at the AJA University of Command and Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army.
Could you elaborate on the AJA University, its level, and the courses taught there?
This university is the oldest command and staff college in the region. AJA University was established in 1933 and began admitting students a year after the University of Tehran, in 1935. In this regard, we were pioneers in the region. In 1933, many countries in the region did not even exist on the map.
As the name suggests, AJA University operates in the field of command issues during war and peace, as well as staff matters, which essentially involve high-level military management. In this university, where students hold the rank of major (battalion commander) and above, they learn how to interact with personnel and advisory groups and utilize their consultations. Essentially, the commander presents an issue to the staff, then members and advisors offer their opinions, and decision-making takes shape, with the commander making the final call. The responsibility for decision-making ultimately lies with the commander.
Command in war and staff management involves specific techniques and globally recognized scientific principles. One of the requirements for attaining the rank of general in the Army is completing this university course.
As far as I know, “The Art of War” is one of the courses you have taught for years to commanders of various ranks. If you were to define it in a few sentences, what is the art of war in your view?
Generally, we consider any task performed with creativity, beauty, and skill to be an art. If you give a pen to anyone literate, they can write, but a calligrapher writes so beautifully and skillfully that their work is displayed in art galleries. Now, if you conduct war — an inherently brutal act — with art, meaning you achieve military objectives with minimal casualties and damage, you have mastered the art of war.
Moreover, the art of war lies in surprising the enemy and, even if the enemy has superior equipment and resources, compensating for your shortcomings creatively.
Based on your definition of the art of war, how well did the eight-year war align with it?
Answering this requires understanding the unique characteristics and conditions of the imposed war. No war is without casualties and destruction because war is fundamentally a violent and hostile clash between two states, countries, or factions. Such a confrontation cannot occur without losses.
We say the art of war lies in achieving military objectives with minimal casualties — meaning, as I mentioned, the commander consults with staff members and military advisors to select and execute an operational plan that aligns closer with this definition. However, no war is possible without casualties, especially in our era, where technology has advanced to the point that military equipment is highly destructive and precise, often resulting in high casualties.
I tell you honestly: the art of war was fully observed by our forces throughout the Holy Defense era. When Iraq invaded our country, the Army was not in full readiness due to post-revolutionary issues. When a revolution occurs in a country, everything undergoes change — norms, behaviors, organizations, etc. The Army was no exception.
After the Revolution, a new way of thinking took hold in the country, and expectations from the Army changed. The Army had to align itself with these new ways of thinking. At that time, our Army followed an American-style structure, which was unacceptable to the domestic and regional political climate.
Could you elaborate on what factors led to this situation for the Army?
When the Revolution and the war occurred, the world was under a bipolar system — one pole being the former Soviet Union and the other the US and Western countries. The Eastern and Western blocs were in constant political, economic, and military competition, seeking to expand their spheres of influence.
Under the Pahlavi regime, Iran had been influenced by Western lifestyles for years. However, the reality was that we shared nearly 2,000 kilometers of borders with the Soviet Union, the leader of the Eastern Bloc. Naturally, the Soviets could not tolerate Western influence in Iran. Moreover, the USSR sought access to the Persian Gulf and Iran’s oil resources, aiming to promote Marxist and communist tendencies in Iran. This led to the establishment of the Tudeh Party in Iran.
Furthermore, the dominant philosophical mindset among global intellectuals, particularly youth and academics in the 1960s and early 1970s, was to liberate societies from dictatorial regimes and steer them toward communist and Marxist economic systems.
The Soviet Union outright rejected the presence of an American-style Army along its borders. Meanwhile, some leftist and communist groups inside Iran believed that military spending was against the country’s interests and that funds should instead be allocated to infrastructure like schools. They overlooked the fact that the most precious asset armies provide is security. Strengthening the military does not increase the likelihood of war; rather, a strong Army can prevent war.
So, all these factors led the Army to experience unique conditions during the Revolution and the start of the war?
There was an almost two-year gap between the Islamic Revolution (early 1979) and the war’s start (late 1980). During this period, the Army had to adapt its ideas, structure, and form to the new system’s demands, naturally undergoing organizational changes.
The Army was transitioning from the imperial era to the Islamic Republic. Though the war had not yet begun, the country faced insecurity in various regions. Opposition groups — from the Tudeh Party to the People’s Mojahedin — began destabilizing cities in western Iran. Unrest emerged in Kurdestan. In Khuzestan, a group tried to incite ethnic tensions among Arab communities. In the northeast (Turkmen Sahra region) and southeast (Baluchestan Province), separatist movements also emerged. However, the most significant unrest was in western Iran. In the first week after the Revolution (late February 1979), the Mahabad garrison was seized and looted by conspirators.
At this point, military force had to be used to restore security. The only military power in the country at the time was the Army — an army undergoing organizational purges and restructuring. Yet, the Army successfully handled the situation: Kurdestan was not seceded, and cities like Paveh and Mahabad did not fall to groups like Komala. The Army also quelled unrest in Turkmen Sahra, Khuzestan, and cities like Khorramshahr and Abadan. The Army’s casualties in this two-year period before the war reached 2,000.
Let’s turn to the Iraqi-imposed war. What led Saddam to consider a military invasion of Iran?
In the two years following the Revolution, Iran championed the slogan “Neither East nor West.” The country broke away from the US and, despite Soviet efforts, did not align with them either.
This period coincided with the bipolar world rivalry. Next to Iran, the Ba’athist regime in Iraq — leaning toward the USSR — ruled. At the time, Iran was the region’s leading power, with a stronger Army than Iraq’s (Iran’s population and territory were four times larger).
Saddam Hussein — a fiercely nationalistic and ethnocentric Arab — viewed Iran with envy. Influenced by the Ba’ath Party’s Arab nationalist ideology, Iraq positioned itself against Iran.
Amid this, the US embassy hostage crisis in Iran occurred, souring Iran-US relations. The USSR expected Iran to align with it, but the Tudeh Party (linked to the Soviets) was banned. Thus, neither the Eastern nor Western Bloc favored Iran.
Meanwhile, Saddam was seeking a pretext to invade Iran. Seeing the situation as opportune, he used border disputes to justify starting the war — despite the 1975 Algiers Agreement, which had resolved all border issues. Although Iran held a position of greater power, we imposed nothing on Iraq in this agreement and resolved the disputes with magnanimity. Under that treaty, the Arvand Rud (Shatt al-Arab) was recognized as a shared border, with both nations having navigation rights. But Saddam claimed exclusive rights for Iraq and even asserted that Khuzestan belonged to Iraq — despite Khuzestan’s millennia-long history as part of Iran. (Iraq was founded in 1920, while Iran’s civilization spans 7,000 years.)
These events unfolded while Iran’s Army was grappling with internal issues and reorganization — it was like hosting uninvited guests while in the middle of moving furniture.
Did the Army not sense Iraq’s military buildup? Were there no warning signs?
According to documented evidence, the Army did issue warnings at the time. Based on military movements inside Iraq and other indicators, the Army had declared that Iraq intended to attack Iran.
Iraq had signed arms deals with the USSR and acquired numerous fighter jets — clear signs of Saddam’s intentions. Yet, some inside Iran refused to believe an attack was possible, and the Army’s warnings were not taken seriously. No one thought Iraq would dare attack Iran.
Moreover, Iran’s intelligence apparatus (named SAVAK before the Revolution) had been dissolved due to its torture of revolutionaries. Parts of SAVAK had been responsible for gathering foreign intelligence, but this function was now absent. Iran’s embassies abroad also lacked significant activity in this regard as diplomats (soldiers of peacetime) were also tasked with monitoring foreign developments.
Under these conditions — about 14 months before the war began, when no one believed Iraq would attack — Lieutenant General Mohammad-Hossein Shaker (then-chief of staff) summoned the commanders of the Ground, Air, and Naval Forces, warning of a threat from Iraq. Accordingly, the Air Force prepared Operation Alborz, the Navy Operation Zulfiqar, and the Ground Forces Operation Abouzar to counter this threat. Since Army forces are usually dispersed nationwide, such contingency plans are necessary for rapid response. However, armies worldwide require higher authorization to mobilize. At the time, the Army’s warnings were ignored — a consequence of the revolutionary transition period and disbelief in Iraq’s aggression.
Under these circumstances, Iraq attacked Iran. How did Iran’s Army and soldiers react?
Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980 — a Monday afternoon. Suddenly, the Iraqi Air Force, with 190 fighter jets, bombed our airbases in Tabriz, Hamedan, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Tehran, Shiraz, Bushehr, Ahvaz, and Omidiyeh. Saddam’s first move was to cripple our air force while our Army was unprepared. Conscription had been reduced from two years to one, effectively halving the Ground Forces from 300,000 to 150,000.
Yet, hours later, our Air Force executed Operation Kaman 99 (Operation Alborz), launching a massive airstrike on Iraqi military targets, airports, and airbases across Iraq. Imagine: this operation was conducted after two years of minimal flight activity.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, Iraq initially made rapid territorial gains. Our border defenses were thin, and mobilizing ground forces took time. The Army’s skill lay in deploying at maximum speed, halting Iraq’s advance within two months.
In its final assault on Susangerd (November 17, 1980), Iraq failed to capture the city — marking the point where Saddam realized he could advance no further.
Saddam had boasted, “I’ll conquer Tehran in a week.” What led him to think this?
Saddam miscalculated. He underestimated the Iranian Army’s strength. The patriotism and dedication of our soldiers thwarted his ambitions.
The people’s involvement was also crucial. Countless civilians volunteered to fight — many untrained in warfare — but their presence boosted morale, showing our troops they had massive public support.
Our Air Force delivered a crushing blow on the first day, crippling Iraq’s air capabilities within two months. Similarly, by December 7 (Navy Day), our Naval Forces had nearly neutralized Iraq’s navy for the rest of the war. These successes stemmed from pre-war plans: Operation Alborz (Air Force) and Operation Zulfiqar (Navy).
In war, when attacked, standard military doctrine dictates first halting the enemy’s advance. This was achieved in the war’s first two months. You asked about the art of war: ours was stopping the enemy despite the Army’s unpreparedness.
General Bakhtiari, let’s discuss your role during the war. Amid the post-revolutionary purges, what was your status in the Army?
At the time, I was in uniform and on payroll, but my position was uncertain. When the war began, I volunteered for the frontlines. Many retired pilots — even those discharged — returned voluntarily. Some even flew missions before formal reinstatement and were martyred.
Given my expertise, I was deployed to Khuzestan, serving as an artillery commander in Dezful. When Major General Sayyad Shirazi became Ground Forces commander in 1981, he invited me to join his operational headquarters in Khuzestan.
You helped plan major operations like Beit al-Moqaddas and Tariq al-Quds under General Sayyad Shirazi. Could you elaborate?
Operations are typically planned by a team, and I was part of it. These were among the war’s successful operations. Earlier successes (like Operation Samen-ol-A’emeh in 1981, which broke the siege of Abadan) occurred before my involvement.
After General Sayyad Shirazi’s appointment, Operation Tariq al-Quds freed Bostan and surrounding villages, splitting Iraqi forces. Next, Operation Fath al-Mobin (west of Andimeshk) pushed Iraqi forces out of northern Khuzestan. Finally, Operation Beit al-Moqaddas liberated Khorramshahr. In summary, four operations freed vast stretches of Khuzestan:
• Samen-ol-A’emeh: 150 km²
• Tariq al-Quds: 600 km²
• Fath al-Mobin: 2,200 km² (Iraqis were pushed near the border)
• Beit al-Moqaddas: 6,000 km² (Khorramshahr’s liberation)
By the end, 8,000 km² of the approximately 15,000 km² occupied land was freed in 8–9 months. After Khorramshahr’s liberation, the war’s tide turned. Iraq had claimed to occupy 15,000 km², but after this, it had no leg to stand on.
Politically and militarily, Saddam should have withdrawn. His goal — seceding Khuzestan — had failed. But his ego as the “Arab champion” drove him to continue, though he held no Iranian territory.
How did foreign support influence Saddam’s decision to prolong the war?
Documents show Saddam had backing from 36 countries. About 95% of Iraq’s equipment was Soviet-supplied.
When the war began, Iraq had 333 fighter jets vs. our 435. Throughout the war, for every one of our planes that was shot down, we had no replacement. Yet by the time the cease-fire took hold, we had shot down around 1,000 Iraqi aircraft — but Iraq still had planes left.
In truth, Iraq was propped up by major powers like the Soviet Union and America, receiving steady supplies of equipment and intelligence, while Iran stood alone against these global powers and all the nations backing Iraq. That was our art of war.