Blueprint for ‘better deal’
Trump’s approach to negotiations with Iran
After four rounds of indirect talks between the diplomatic delegations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States — led by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump’s special envoy for West Asia — differences over uranium enrichment have stirred up a fresh wave of analysis and speculation about the fate of the negotiations. The Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained a firm, unchanging stance, repeatedly emphasized in recent weeks by its president, foreign minister, and foreign ministry spokesperson: “Enrichment in Iran will continue, whether there is an agreement or not.” Javad Haghgoo, an international relations expert and associate professor at the University of Tehran, shed light on this issue and, more broadly, the dynamics of Tehran-Washington negotiations in the interview below:
Given the deep-seated disputes between the Islamic Republic and the US — especially Iran’s unending hostility toward the Israeli regime, which is a major factor shaping US foreign policy — how do you assess the future of Tehran-Washington relations?
HAGHGOO: All the signs point to the fact that, since October 7, 2023, Iran’s tensions with Israel and the United States have reached a boiling point, entering a high-risk, pre-conflict phase. In this period, the simultaneous advance of three elements — namely, military threats, asymmetric operations, and diplomatic negotiations — is turning the future into the present. Despite all the posturing and speculation about Iran-US talks, public positions reflect a fragile environment.
Given this, it seems the period ahead — at least until mid-2025 — will be marked by a delicate balance between diplomatic initiatives and talk of military threats. While negotiations have kept hopes for de-escalation alive, simultaneous cyber operations or arms transfers could raise the risk of conflict breaking out.
In such an environment, and based on current trends, what scenarios do you see for the future of Iran-US-Israel relations?
Indeed, in today’s tangled world — where wars have essentially entered the fifth generation and hybrid confrontation is the name of the game — it’s entirely possible for several scenarios to play out in parallel. These scenarios are actually fivefold, each with a different chance of taking place. What is more, if signs gravitate toward one scenario, it doesn’t mean that the others would not take place in the end. These five scenarios can be categorized into three more comprehensive scenarios.
Scenario one: The negotiations move forward step by step toward success. This scenario has the most supporters at the domestic, regional, and global levels. It unfolds in phases and isn’t expected to reach a conclusion overnight. Given the current US administration’s priorities, Trump’s personal style, and Iran’s domestic situation, it won’t take long to find out whether this scenario pans out. According to some calculations using modern tools and technologies, the likelihood exceeds 50%. Here, both back-channel and open diplomacy need to be kept on the radar.
Scenario two: Regional developments spill over into the talks, or vice versa. This includes two sub-scenarios: a drop in the chances of a successful deal and the onset of tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, or increased uncertainty about the talks’ outcome and a flare-up in the Red Sea. There’s no doubt that regional events — Yemen, for instance — can’t be analyzed in isolation from Iran. One likely scenario is conflict in the region flaring up, which could both influence and be influenced by the fate of the negotiations.
Tension in the Strait of Hormuz is also a possibility, though less likely due to opposition from key players like China and Gulf states. Events under this scenario would largely stem from strategic miscalculations on both sides.
Scenario three: The talks hit a brick wall. This pessimistic scenario includes the negotiations running into deadlock, a surge in digital and cyber warfare, or even a complete breakdown, leading to missile exchanges or air battles. While these confrontations have precedent, there’s a real chance they could crop up again. Given Netanyahu’s dissatisfaction with a US-Iran deal, expect a spike in digital and cyber skirmishes in the coming months. New hacker groups could spring up. Players like Netanyahu and other opponents of a deal will make the most of these opportunities.
It’s crucial to note that the outcome of these talks could send shockwaves through the global economy — which is why this scenario has significant opposition. Assuming tensions flare up and continue on one front, and the trade war between the US and China heats up — which isn’t far-fetched — the international system is likely to head down the path toward a kind of pre-war radicalization. Escalation between Iran and the US/Israel is hardly in the interest of China or Gulf states, though Russia could stand to gain from rising tensions.
Given that some analysts say the odds of a deal with the US have dropped since Trump’s return, while others see the chances rising, does it really matter who’s in the White House?
There’s no doubt that there are real differences among US presidents and their administrations. The idea that all US presidents are “cut from the same cloth” is just empty rhetoric.
History shows that there are, in fact, significant differences between US presidents. It’s true that, like other countries — and perhaps even more so — the US has a well-defined legal and political structure, rooted in its Constitution and ordinary laws, and that a set of clear frameworks holds sway over all presidents. But to imagine that every decision is cooked up behind closed doors by a single group, and that, for example, bringing Trump, Obama, or Biden to power is all the work of that same group, is a childish notion. There’s no question that who ends up in the roles of president, secretary of state, or national security advisor makes a real difference. In fact, this is even more apparent when it comes to foreign policy.
For example, in Iran, the executive and legislative branches each have their roles, but the impact of the person implementing the law is far greater than that of the lawmaker. The same logic applies to the US presidency. There are clear distinctions between, say, Obama and Trump. The real skill is capitalizing on these differences to serve national interests. While both may share a “hegemonic streak,” their worldviews and approaches to international relations can be worlds apart.
For instance, Trump might cut a deal with Russia to rein in China, whereas Biden, though aware of the China threat, would never team up with Moscow to contain Beijing. International relations is all about spotting these cracks — sometimes no bigger than a chink in the armor — and slipping through to pursue your country’s interests.
Given the volatile and ever-changing nature of international relations, there’s no room for procrastination. If you look back at Iran’s position before and after the Russia-Ukraine war, you’ll see how many opportunities slipped through our fingers because we failed to grasp the instability of the international scene. We ended up settling for far less than before, and even those reduced gains didn’t last as the other side had already cottoned on to the new reality. In international relations, it’s best to grab what you can now rather than hold out for a promise down the line.
Is there a historical example from Iran-US relations, before or after Iran’s Islamic Revolution, that illustrates this point?
Absolutely. Perhaps the best example is the early years after the Revolution, when the US embassy was seized and the 444-day hostage crisis unfolded. During that period, Iran dealt with two US presidents: Carter and Reagan. Iran could have struck a bargain with Carter, who was desperate for the hostages’ release to boost his re-election chances, or it could have dragged things out to undermine Carter and cut a deal with his rival, Reagan. In the end, it seems Iran chose the latter as the crisis ended on January 20, 1981, just as Reagan entered the White House. Evidence suggests Iran released the hostages without securing any concessions from Reagan — a move that, if true, holds valuable lessons for today.
Later, some, like then-Texas governor John Connally, claimed they urged Tehran not to release the 52 hostages before the election, promising that after Reagan’s victory, the US would hammer out a better deal with Iran. This never happened, and some believe Iran, under Reagan’s threats, was forced to bring the standoff to an end. All these claims need to be verified at a later date. Regardless, the main takeaway is that there are real differences among US presidents, and at times, you have more room to maximize your national interests.
So, what are the key features of Trump’s presidency in this context?
Because of these personal and team differences, it seems it’s actually easier to strike a deal with Trump than with Biden or Obama. Americans like Trump, when they talk about negotiation and agreement, don’t really care about the broader structures of international relations or the views of Washington’s allies or the stated values of liberal democracy; they only care about US interests as they define them. If they feel there’s something in it for them, they’ll go after it.
The problem arises when they sense others have walked away with gains while they’ve gotten nothing. That’s when, as with the JCPOA, they’ll tear up the agreement. This highlights the importance of understanding your counterpart’s precise characteristics and tailoring your approach accordingly. Whether talks are direct or indirect doesn’t matter much; what counts is that, in Trump’s case, he needs to be able to sell the deal at home and claim, “Look, I got a better agreement than Obama, and I deserve the Nobel Peace Prize, too.”
For Americans, a “better deal” than the JCPOA doesn’t necessarily mean the other side gave up more; it could simply mean that, unlike last time, they’re able to get their foot in the door and invest in Iran. Instead of handing out concessions to a dozen countries, you give one — America — an economic advantage, which may be less than what was given to all those intermediaries before. Of course, Trump’s love of showmanship and media spectacle shouldn’t be underestimated; he and his team are seasoned pros at playing to the gallery. The key is to ensure that any concession has real propaganda value.
Given this history, can Trump be compared to Reagan, and Biden/Obama to Carter?
Certainly, such comparisons can be made, though one must be mindful of differences in individuals, eras, circumstances, and issues. Some argue that Trump and Reagan are quite different, but I personally believe their similarities outweigh their differences.
In my view, Trump’s foreign policy is more “neo-Reaganite” than “neo-Jacksonian.” This resemblance is precisely why there’s reason to be wary of future negotiations with Trump’s America; if talks don’t move forward in a timely manner, they may yield no benefit for our national interests — just as, in recent years, many opportunities were squandered on flimsy pretexts, to the detriment of the majority and the benefit of a select few.
Like Reagan, Trump believes that the road to peace runs through strength — and, more importantly, the display of strength. The deployment of additional B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia fits this mindset, and these moves aren’t just about Iran but a wide range of states. In this view, war is not the end of diplomacy; rather, conflict is part and parcel of diplomacy, meant to bring you to the point where you have no bargaining chips left and are forced to throw in the towel. That’s the crossroads you must avoid at all costs.
Obviously, if you play by the rules set by the likes of Netanyahu, you’ll pay a heavy price, and future generations will surely hold you accountable. As Imam Ali (PBUH) said, justice means putting everything in its proper place — so, in governance, timing is everything. If you act too late or too soon, you’re bound to do more harm than good. In statecraft, this is even more critical.
The article first appeared in Persian
on IRNA.