Tehran, Manama set out to mend ties: Former diplomat
‘Zero-tension strategy’ key to regional development
Like most countries, Iran’s foreign policy rests on a three-pronged approach: its neighbors, the region, and the wider world. Tehran has been striving to strike a balance among these three pillars, aiming to push forward both its short- and long-term interests. The interplay and mutual influence among these elements make it essential to draw the line on priorities and red lines. Shedding light on the policies shaping these dynamics and their reciprocal effects, Nosratollah Tajik, former Iranian ambassador to Jordan and regional affairs expert, provided his insights in the following interview.
IRNA: Over the past year, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has made the neighborhood policy and engagement with Arab states of the Persian Gulf a top priority. How do you assess this approach? Has it managed to build trust and dial down tensions in the region?
TAJIK: Every country’s foreign policy is built on three pillars: neighborhood, regional, and global strategies. These three layers feed into each other, with each exerting influence and responding in turn. In Iran’s case, the global and regional dimensions have traditionally carried more weight, which has inevitably rubbed off on its neighborhood policy. In fact, you can’t break down Iran’s neighborhood diplomacy without considering its regional and international relations.
Each of these levels is indispensable and cannot stand in for the others. They each operate in their own sphere and carry their own weight. To think that a neighborhood policy could take the place of a regional one, or that regional ties could substitute for global engagement, is simply misguided. They are interdependent and must move forward in tandem. Only a well-crafted strategy that brings together these three levels into a balanced triangle can roll out an effective, dynamic foreign policy that maximizes national interests.
We must recognize the unique role of neighborhood policy and how it can play out in practice, especially since each level has its own theoretical underpinnings. If we lose sight of this, then when a government, for example, puts regional policy front and center, questions would arise about the fate of global relations. You can’t swap out smooth international relations for a solely regional approach, nor can you slot in neighborhood policy as a replacement. Moreover, it’s not enough for a government to talk up such priorities; It needs both theoretical and practical foundations, with all sectors pulling in the same direction rather than canceling each other out.
Iran has 15 neighbors, each with diverse economic, political, social, and cultural characteristics. Our current focus is on the Persian Gulf, a region of immense geostrategic value due to its energy resources and centrality to global industry. The Persian Gulf’s importance is self-evident. The current Iranian administration has made a push to bring down surrounding tensions — a wise move. If Iran can hammer out a zero-tension strategy with its southern Arab neighbors along the Persian Gulf, the region stands to reap the rewards of greater development.
But this isn’t something that can fall into place just because one or even all countries wish it. It requires a string of prerequisites, groundwork, and political will — or at the very least, harmony. If any country plays out of tune, that harmony will not materialize, and the region won’t get off the ground in terms of development and modernization. While some countries have made headway in these areas, security remains the bedrock of progress, and not all have achieved it. Regional transformations are also shaped by broader Middle Eastern developments.
The Pezeshkian administration’s focus on neighbors is a positive step, but it coincides with upheavals in the Middle East, especially in Palestine, the Occupied Territories, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. These tensions have set the stage for perceptions — among both neighbors and outside powers — that Iran, having lost some of its external deterrence, is now in a weaker position. This has opened the door for Iran to draw closer to its southern Persian Gulf neighbors. Yet, it’s still early days; the Middle East remains volatile and unpredictable.
It’s not as simple as a figure like Trump dropping in, making waves, and expecting all his ideas to take root. We all remember his first term, when he visited Saudi Arabia and joined in the sword dance. Many believed his proposals would come to fruition, but the events of October 2023 showed the region heading in a different direction.
In my view, Iran’s neighborhood policy is still in its infancy. The groundwork is being laid out, and preliminary agreements have been struck. Trust-building measures between Iran and the southern Persian Gulf states are getting off the ground, though the foundation isn’t yet solid and could still be knocked off course by other developments. Still, it seems that the parties involved have the will to see this through. Whether all issues are within their control remains to be seen. It will take time.
Iran’s relationships with regional states are far from uniform. With some, like Oman, there’s a strategic partnership and deep friendship; with others, relations are chilly. What should Iran do to step up its game and bring more countries on board?
There are many reasons for the unevenness in Iran’s ties with its neighbors. The southern Persian Gulf states have widely varying histories of political, social, and economic interaction with Iran. Some, like Oman, have deep-rooted ties, while others are newer on the scene, having only emerged as nation-states since the 1970s. In short, Iran’s relationships with these countries run the gamut. Yet, they are all part of a collective mechanism — the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a six-nation bloc established after Iran’s
Islamic Revolution. The GCC often bands together to present a united front against Iran.
When it comes to improving or expanding these ties, two theoretical models are usually put forward: collective cooperation or bilateral relations. So far, collective cooperation between Iran and its southern neighbors hasn’t taken off, despite numerous proposals. Instead, most ties have been handled one-on-one, which, while somewhat successful, hasn’t led to any real breakthroughs. On paper, there may be plenty of protocols and agreements, but in practice, there’s been little tangible progress. This is partly due to the foreign policy inclinations of these states and the structure of the GCC, where Saudi Arabia calls the shots as the “big brother” to the other five.
Thus, neither through collective nor bilateral means have we managed to forge stable, flourishing relations that could set the stage for balanced regional political, social, and economic ties. Unfortunately, neither bilateral relations nor joint summits between the northern and southern shores of the Persian Gulf have yielded a dominant discourse or a model based on complementary economic advantages. This gap has given rise to mutual suspicion. Some of this stems from Iran’s regional and global policies, and some from the southern states. To date, I haven’t seen any study that weighs up each side’s role in this lack of progress. Iran can certainly make a difference by fine-tuning its policies, and the southern Arab states can also play a key role.
The most decisive factor, however, is the involvement of external powers. Unfortunately, their approach is rarely constructive; Instead, they tend to stir up trouble and drive wedges between countries. Take Trump’s recent visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE: Beyond his inflammatory rhetoric, he sought to pit these countries against each other and talked up one side at the expense of the other. This is hardly a recipe for regional cooperation. Given our historical baggage, we still face unresolved issues, but we have no choice but to move past this and shift gears toward constructive engagement between the northern and southern Persian Gulf.
Bahrain is one regional country where Iran currently has no embassy. What do you see as the main challenge in restoring ties, especially given recent contacts? Are the two sides on a path to fully resume relations?
Bahrain’s situation among the six southern neighbors is truly unique and complex. Part of this is due to historical, territorial, and geographic ties, and another part is rooted in cultural, religious, and past connections. Bahrain is the only country in the region ruled by a Sunni minority over a Shia majority. This is a legacy of the close ties that once bound Iran and Bahrain. Thus, managing this relationship requires a different approach. With most countries, the golden rule is good neighborliness, but with Bahrain, we need to go above and beyond.
Finding the right formula for our foreign policy — especially our neighborhood strategy — is crucial. This will spill over into our regional and international standing, provided we take into account both sides’ sensitivities and concerns. For example, cooperation should raise the bar for the political and social rights of Bahrain’s Shia majority, allowing Bahrainis to sort out majority-minority issues internally, while Iran keeps out of their domestic affairs and maintains a balanced, dignified relationship with both the government and the people. The relationship should be such that it doesn’t cast a shadow over Iran’s ties with Bahrain or other countries.
Given the recent meetings and contacts — some of which got underway during the previous Iranian administration and carried over into the current administration — it appears both sides are on track to rebuild ties and move past previous difficulties. The aim is to put in place a stable, practical relationship free from third-party interference. Domestic conditions in Iran and the regional environment, which has been somewhat imposed on Iran, also play a role. God willing, we’ll see where this leads.
What benefits would Iran stand to gain by getting back on track with all its neighbors?
The first benefit of normalized relations is a safer environment for Iran. Every country seeks not only internal security but also secure borders and, beyond that, the political and psychological security that flows from stable, dignified ties with neighbors. Good neighborliness and thriving relations can go a long way toward ensuring these layers of security, making the country less vulnerable to threats from, or through, its neighbors.
This is the bare minimum. To move beyond that, we must recognize that each neighbor has unique economic, social, and cultural advantages. When people can move freely and cross borders without obstacles, such human exchanges pave the way for new models of cooperation — especially in trade and economics, but also in culture. These forms of cooperation will, in turn, spill over into the political sphere.
As a result, such relations take a load off the country’s foreign policy; When ties with neighbors are routine, calm, and constructive, the foreign policy team no longer needs to get bogged down in every minor issue, allowing it to focus on bigger challenges. The benefits of good neighborly relations should not be underestimated; they can have a profoundly positive impact across the political, social, economic, cultural, and even human levels.
Donald Trump, the US president, made the rounds in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, with Iran and the nuclear deal high on the agenda. What message do you think the Iranian foreign minister’s visits to these countries ahead of Trump’s trip sent, and what were these countries expecting from Trump in talks about Iran?
I’ve already touched on Trump’s trip in earlier answers. We live in a region that is underdeveloped, or at best, just starting out on the path to development. All of us here are classified as developing countries. The southern neighbors see a strong Iran as a potential hegemon, and thus are keen to keep Iran in check. Regional developments have mostly played out to Iran’s detriment, creating what they see as an opportunity to redefine relations with the Arab world.
In my view, much of the foreign minister’s recent travel was a result of Iran’s policy in this period. Unlike during the JCPOA era, when outreach to the southern Persian Gulf states was limited — partly because they unreasonably wanted a direct seat at the negotiating table, which Iran opposed — we also dropped the ball tactically by not keeping them in the loop. Naturally, they sourced their information elsewhere and mounted opposition to the JCPOA, working to undermine it.
However, in this new era, Iran has rolled out a more effective strategy to inform them. Recent consultations with China, Russia, Europe, and Arab states fit into this approach, and were less about Trump’s trip per se. Trump’s visit was not just political; his main goals were economic, aimed at drumming up investment. In reality, his trip was more about opening up markets for American goods and services.
Meanwhile, the region’s countries are flush with cash — both because of Iran’s absence from the oil market and their own ambitions to break into global markets in energy, goods, new technology, AI, and digital industries. These are the opportunities Trump is zeroing in on: tapping into their financial resources and sealing deals for engineering services to give the US economy a shot in the arm.
The article first appeared in
Persian on IRNA.