Iran could gain from Russian support in JCPOA negotiations
Moscow opposes new military conflict in region
The impact of Russia’s involvement in the negotiations surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is advantageous for Iran. Additionally, Moscow is firmly against the prospect of a new military conflict in the region. The influence of Russia in the negotiations surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) appears to be beneficial for Iran, particularly in light of the current geopolitical landscape. The deputy of the Institute for Iran and Eurasia Studies (IERAS) highlighted that, historically, there may have been concerns regarding whether Russia’s policies aligned with Iran’s interests, raising the possibility that Russia could have pursued a different trajectory in nuclear negotiations. However, he stated, “now that the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) has been signed and the only remaining issue is the restoration of its implementation, it seems that Russia cannot play a seriously negative role in advancing the negotiations.” On Tuesday, Sergey Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, arrived in Iran as part of his regional diplomatic tour after visiting Turkey. Although this visit was framed within a regional diplomatic context, its relative timing with the meeting between the foreign ministers of Russia and the United States in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, as well as the telephone conversation between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the US President Donald Trump has raised questions about Lavrov’s mission in Tehran.
Mahmoud Shouri
IRNA conducted an interview with with Mahmoud Shouri, the deputy of the IERAS and a senior analyst on Russian affairs on Lavrov's readiness to assist in resolving Iran's nuclear file through diplomacy, combined with the differing perspectives in Iran regarding Russia's role over the years:
Lavrov stated in a press conference with his Iranian counterpart that, in light of the existing maximum pressure on Iran, it is not negotiating, asserting, “Russia believes that the window for diplomacy is still open, and Moscow is ready to play a role in this regard.” Given the current tensions in the relationship between Russia and Europe, alongside Russia and the US working towards de-escalating their relationship, what role do you think Russia can play in this context?
The reality is that the situation is exceedingly complex, and the influencing variables are changing constantly. As a result, analyzing the status and accurately determining the role of each actor and the prevailing conditions remains a challenging task. However, at present, we are confronted with the situation where Russia and the US are entering a process of normalizing their relations, attempting to resolve some of their past differences. In this process, it is natural that various issues and topics will be discussed and reviewed, and Iran’s situation is likely to be one of those subjects.
Amidst this, there are concerns—particularly in Iran—where some believe that the dialogues between Russia and the US may negatively impact Iran’s international standing and become a topic of interaction between the two countries. However, this perspective, in my opinion, is rather pessimistic. It is essential to recognize that Russia is currently striving to resolve one of its most significant challenges in recent years and to extricate itself from the difficult circumstances it has faced over the past three years. Therefore, as long as Moscow cannot re-establish itself as an influential player on the international stage and exert influence over other major powers like the US and Europe, it still has a long way to go.
My assessment is that the discussions between Russia and the US will not have a significant impact on Iran’s fate in the short term. Even if they do exert influence, it will not be negative in any way. Russia still faces numerous obstacles, and until it can resolve these issues, it will remain far from returning to a position where it can seriously influence global matters.
Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht-Ravanchi emphasized after the second round of talks with the European Troika that the 1+5 format in the JCPOA negotiations may not be effective due to the differences arising between Russia and Europe. Following these remarks, the Russian ambassador in Tehran stressed that without China and Russia, the lifting of sanctions and the revival of the JCPOA would not be possible. In such a scenario, what do you think the path forward for Iran will be in these negotiations, assuming they commence?
In the short term, it seems unlikely that the conditions will arise for the five major global powers to convene again on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, especially given the existing rifts between Russia and Europe. However, another question arises: is there even a necessity for these meetings and discussions to take place again? Do the members of the P5+1 really need to come together once more to talk about Iran’s nuclear issue?
In this context, there are a number of technical matters that need to be worked out between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the issues surrounding the disagreements between Iran and Europe, particularly regarding the potential activation of the trigger mechanism or snapback, are special concerns between Iran and the European Troika.
From Iran’s perspective, it can be said that the influence of Russia and China in nuclear negotiations will certainly be beneficial, and it is in Iran’s interest for some of the existing challenges with the European parties to be managed by Russia or China. In the past, there may have been concerns that Russia’s policies were not necessarily aligned with Iran’s interests and that Russia might pursue a different path in nuclear negotiations. However, now that the nuclear agreement has been signed and the only remaining issue is the restoration of its implementation, it seems that Russia cannot play a seriously negative role in advancing the negotiations.
In fact, Russia’s current role appears to function more as a balancing factor against Europe and the challenges that have arisen with them. It seems unlikely that the Russians would be eager to activate the trigger mechanism or snapback, nor would they be pleased with European efforts to activate this mechanism. For this reason, I do not see Iran’s and Russia’s interests in the nuclear file as being in conflict with one another. Therefore, we should not be overly concerned about the possibility of the Russians becoming active again in nuclear negotiations. However, as I mentioned, there may not be much room for Russia to play a significant role and have a serious impact in these negotiations.
According to published reports, Syria has been one of the key topics in the discussions between the foreign ministers of Iran and Russia. Unlike Tehran, Moscow has begun engaging with the new Syrian government, and the discussions between Lavrov and Turkish foreign minister Fidan have centered around Syria as well. What do you think will happen to Iran-Russia relations in Syria given the change in government there?
The Russians have interests in Syria that remain intact. Despite the changes in the Syrian government, although some of these interests have experienced interruptions, certain Russian interests, especially in relation to their military bases in Syria, are still in place. One of Russia’s primary concerns in this regard is the fate of these bases. Russia has two scenarios in mind:
The first scenario is that Russia aims to stabilize the current Syrian government so that it can extend and solidify its sovereignty over all of Syrian territory. In line with this scenario, the Russians have naturally prioritized engagement with the current Syrian government. Part of this engagement takes place through Turkey, while another part relates to Russia’s direct interactions with the new Syrian government.
In a more optimistic scenario for the Russians, if the situation in Syria stabilizes, they will seek to maintain their interests through engagement with the new government. In this context, while Iran may not be able to play a significantly influential role in Syria, Russia could potentially act as a facilitator for Iran—not as a mediator. This means that Russia could assist Tehran in re-establishing its relations with Damascus and regaining its role in Syria.
In the second scenario, given that Iran still maintains some of its influence over various factions and groups in Syria, the Russians will look to benefit from Iran’s assistance. The main goal is to control tensions in Syria and ensure that the situation does not develop in a way that jeopardizes Russian interests in the country. Thus, part of the objectives of Lavrov’s visit to Turkey and Iran is to advance these dual scenarios that Russia has regarding Syria.
There are varying opinions within Iran regarding Russia’s role in the establishment of the JCPOA and subsequent efforts to revive it. Some believe that Russia is throwing obstacles in the path of de-escalating relations between Iran and the West. What kind of relationship between Iran and the West do you think is desirable for Russia?
The circumstances have changed significantly, and the analytical clichés that we often rely on to assess situations may not always hold true. In this case, I think the situation is markedly different; Russia is currently in a process of de-escalation with the United States, while tensions with Europe remain high and unresolved. Conversely, Iran has serious tensions with the US but has begun to ease tensions with Europe, as European countries may be inclined to activate the trigger mechanism, which is not favorable for Iran. Therefore, under these conditions, the Russian perspective is naturally somewhat different from the past.
In the past, Russia tried to advance its goals and interests while engaging with the West, which at that time exhibited a certain unity between Europe and the US. Within this framework, we occasionally observed actions from Russia that may not have been in Iran’s favor, especially regarding UN resolutions. During that period, Russia would sometimes vote in favor of anti-Iran resolutions to align itself with Western powers.
However, the situation is now different. Iran is faced with the question of whether the Europeans will activate the trigger mechanism. In this context, it is only natural that the Russians should not be inclined to activate this mechanism, as doing so would mean reverting to the past and restarting all previous negotiations. Moreover, such an action could provoke severe reactions from Iran, with a potential exit from the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), which would certainly not be in Russia’s interest. Therefore, in the conflict between Iran and Europe, Russia cannot side with the Europeans, both due to its own issues with Europe and because what the Europeans seek is not suitable for Russia.
Regarding the US, Russia faces two options: either the tensions between the US and Iran escalate to a critical point, leading to a new conflict in the region—which is certainly not a preferred option for Russia, as it could endanger its interests—or Iran may choose to back down in the face of US pressure, which would also be undesirable for Russia.
In my opinion, what the Russians will certainly aim for in their dealings with the US is to prevent the escalation of tensions between Iran and the West as much as possible. Of course, within the limits of what the circumstances allow, we know that Moscow’s hands are not entirely free in this situation. However, if we assume that Russia can somehow normalize its relationship with the US, it will likely strive not only to prevent tensions between Iran and the West from reaching an uncontrollable stage but also to avoid excessive efforts at de-escalation.
Thus, it can be said that Russia will continue its previous policy: that is, to prevent military tensions and promote limited de-escalation between Iran and the West.
The article first appeared in Persian on IRNA.