Are Syrian developments threat or opportunity for Iran?
By Nosratollah Tajik
Former Iranian ambassador
to Jordan
HAM MIHAN: Given the recent developments in Syria, should Syria be considered a potential future source of threats to Iran, or is there a possibility that Iran can reach an understanding with the forces that will hold power in Syria in the future?
TAJIK: Since there are no shared borders or territorial disputes between Iran and Syria, under normal circumstances, neither Syria poses a threat to Iran nor does Iran pose a threat to Syria.
The current situation in Syria is highly ambiguous, and the final outcome remains uncertain. One scenario envisions relative stability in Syria, while another foresees a resurgence of civil wars with various factions. There is also the possibility of external aggression. Israel, for instance, has already acted aggressively, destroying 90% of Syria’s military and armament infrastructure! So, we might even witness the fragmentation of Syria. On the whole, the situation in Syria is characterized by instability and unpredictability.
The current state of Syria is far worse than Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall, Iraq in 2006 during the peak of internal conflicts, or even Libya post-Gaddafi. One of the most important reasons why I believe Syria’s situation is extremely dire is the goals and desires of internal actors who may only be united in their opposition to Bashar al-Assad and nothing else. Furthermore, the conflicting and often contradictory territorial ambitions of multiple, opposing external powers in Syria create uncertainty about how actors such as Turkey and Israel will coexist, for example, regarding the Kurdish issue. Recently, Israel has demonstrated a strong territorial appetite in Syria, even now that Assad is out of the picture. We did not witness such conditions in Libya or Iraq.
Israel has shown that the issue of Syria is not merely a difference of political opinion to them; rather, they pursue geostrategic objectives in Syria that necessitate turning it into a scorched earth. However, regarding Iran, I believe that under any regime, Syria does not pose a direct threat to Iran. Nonetheless, the possibility of Iran reaching an understanding with Syria’s new rulers seems feasible to me. It is the country of Syria that holds strategic importance for Iran for various reasons, not the individual or group that eventually governs Syria.
During the Assad family’s rule, Hafez al-Assad and later Bashar al-Assad maintained very close relations with Tehran due to the historical bilateral ties both before and after Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Today, it is unclear how the future of Tehran-Damascus relations will unfold as it, above all, depends on who will govern Syria. Given the multitude of armed factions, as well as foreign interventions, the first step is to determine who will emerge victorious in Syria and gain the people’s support. Whichever party gets to establish a legitimate and internationally recognized government in Syria, Iran can then forge reasonable relations with that government.
Could past investments and financial, monetary, and commercial relations between the two countries complicate future relations?
The only remaining issue is the past investments and financial, monetary, and commercial relations established between the two countries. These matters have legal solutions that international bodies and both countries can pursue. Once a stable and legitimate government is formed in Syria, these issues can be resolved through legal mechanisms.
Iran has always maintained relations at various levels with the Kurds in Syria. Is there a possibility that if Iran’s interests in Syria are threatened by Turkey, Tehran would use Kurdish leverages against Ankara’s interests?
Aside from the idea that Iran might use Kurds as leverage against Turkey, the issue of the Kurds is a fundamental and deeply rooted matter for Iran. Kurds reside in four countries in the Middle East — Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Naturally, developments related to the Kurdish nation, whether in terms of relations among different Kurdish groups or the Kurds’ relations with regional governments, are important to Tehran and are closely monitored by it.
Syrian Kurds have had ties with Iran for a long time. Particularly since 2011 and the ensuing developments in Syria, the Syrian Kurds and Iran have strengthened their relations. Given Turkey’s role in recent Syrian developments and its military posture towards Kobani, Kurds believe they are on the brink of a military confrontation with Turkey. Naturally, Turkey’s actions could exacerbate some regional disputes. Although there are reports of an agreement between Kurdish groups and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to hand over the management of oil-rich areas in Deir ez-Zor to Syria’s new rulers, my prediction is that this region will not achieve peace easily or quickly, and tensions will persist in eastern and northeastern Syria.
How do you view the prospects for understanding and agreement between Iran and the US regarding Syria if a dialogue between Tehran and Washington occurs in the future?
On the surface, the US claims it has not played a role in the recent developments in Syria, but I believe the US has been one of the parties orchestrating and supporting these developments and is now taking this stance to avoid any political repercussions. It is unlikely that Turkey alone can provide the level of training, logistical support, and weaponry to HTS. I doubt Turkey alone possesses this level of financial, support, and military capability.
My guess is that the US and Israel have played a direct or indirect role in this matter. However, I also doubt that Iran and the US are prepared to engage in dialogue regarding Syria. Beyond the desires of both parties, the circumstances do not necessitate such talks. There are more important priorities that Iran and the US have better groundwork for dialogue and even cooperation on. Issues like Gaza and Lebanon could have provided a basis for dialogue between Iran and the US, but regarding Syria, I still see no grounds for dialogue. This matter currently, and at least from a regional perspective, needs to be addressed through local mechanisms.
Can Iran rely on its connections with Sunni fundamentalist factions that currently hold power in Syria?
Essentially, this appears to be one of the few paths available for Iran to engage with the new ruling factions in Syria, and there are no obstacles preventing Iran from using this route. Iran maintains interactions with various Sunni factions across the Middle East.
While the country’s official policy might be to advance future relations in Syria through formal and international diplomatic interactions, it does not conflict with building connections through various Sunni factions with the governing groups in Syria. Iran can use this approach to establish relationships and exchange messages with any ruling group in Syria, regardless of who they are, to lay the groundwork for reestablishing initial relations between the two sides.
However, there may be misconceptions on both sides. For example, al-Jolani, on the one hand, speaks about expelling Iran from Syria, and on the other hand, declares readiness for strategic engagement with Iran. If informal channels of interaction with Syria’s new ruling council can be established and a minimal level of mutual trust regarding the future relations and policies of both sides is achieved, then formal and diplomatic engagement can follow.
Iran has previously collaborated with Sunni groups, whether in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine (i.e., Hamas), the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, or even Syria itself. I believe there are no obstacles to activating these channels, and we can use various strategies to enhance maneuverability for building trust and confidence with Syria’s new ruling council.
How likely do you think it is for Syria’s border with Jordan to become insecure?
I find it unlikely. Jordanians follow a policy of ensuring that the problems of neighboring countries do not spill over into Jordan. Jordan itself is a vulnerable community, and with around 700,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan — some estimates claim double that number — Jordan is affected not only politically and militarily but also socially by the situation in Syria. Moreover, due to Jordan’s demographic composition, the country is highly susceptible to both internal as well as regional and international developments.
Given the significant presence of individuals of Palestinian descent in Jordan, ongoing developments can impact Jordan’s situation. There is no doubt that the root cause of the current regional tensions is related to the Palestinian issue, and Jordanians strive to prevent additional tensions and conflicts from being imposed on them beyond what has already been imposed. I doubt that the Jordanian government would allow the borders between Jordan and Syria to be affected.
In the initial hours following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, we observed that on the same day, December 8, Jordan closed its borders with Syria. Overall, I find it unlikely that any incident will occur along the Jordan-Syria border. In my view, among Syria’s neighbors, the most vulnerable borders belong to Turkey in northern Syria, where forces known as the Syrian National Army, supportive of Turkey, are stationed. To the east, the border with Iraq is also vulnerable, as internal conflicts in Syria could easily spill over into these two areas more than into any other Syrian border.
Do you think that Shia armed groups in Syria, who were previously trained and organized under General Soleimani, are currently dormant but may become active against the new order in Syria in the future?
The forces that were trained in Syria as Basij or the Popular Mobilization Forces have apparently been integrated into the Syrian army and seem to have become irrelevant after the end of the conflicts in Syria. However, it is unlikely that these groups would take action. The root cause of the recent events in Syria largely stems from the Syrian army’s unwillingness to resist insurgents. If we delve deeper into the factors behind the army’s reluctance to resist, it might be primarily due to Syria’s severe economic situation and the sanctions imposed by the US, which have crippled Syria’s economy and led to extreme poverty among its citizens, especially the Syrian army.
Furthermore, one can point to Bashar al-Assad’s lack of commitment to implementing structural and fundamental changes in the government and his inability to alter his approaches, which failed to endear the people to his regime. This has significantly damaged the Assad family’s standing due to their reluctance to pursue necessary reforms and fundamental changes.
Based on the available evidence, I doubt that the groups in question currently play any significant role in Syria’s present situation, although future developments could lead to other arrangements. Overall, I find it unlikely that such groups can be relied upon. However, the reality is that Syria’s future is so ambiguous and the conditions are so bleak and complex that making definitive predictions about the future is impossible.
What do you know about Israel’s future plans for Syria? Now that there are no military forces in Syria, do you consider Israel’s threats regarding its ability and plan to strike Iran as psychological warfare or a serious threat?
Israel has completely destroyed one of the region’s most powerful armies. Regardless of how much the new Syrian ruling council disagrees with the former government, Syria still needs an army and military equipment to defend its sovereignty. Israel is truly exploiting the current situation, and one could say that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey, has paved the way for one of the largest Islamic countries to fall into a dire and defenseless state. However, I doubt that Israel’s capacity to strike Iran through Syria has significantly increased as Israel has taken the same path before.
It is true that Syrians had radar and tracking capabilities in Syrian airspace, but Israel always targeted these radars. If Israel wanted to carry out an attack on Iran, it could easily use Syrian airspace. I believe that the strikes Israel made on Syrian military equipment and armaments were intended to neutralize Syria as a threat and eliminate Syria’s military capabilities for their own security.
Regarding Iran, I do not think these developments and Israel’s access to Iran through Syria have much importance. Israel has previously utilized Syrian airspace, passing through southwestern Syria, and used Jordanian airspace. Accessing Iraqi airspace to strike Iran was not particularly complicated or difficult, either. Now, with the Syrian army dismantled, it might seem that a significant transformation has occurred regarding Israel’s ability to attack on Iran. In reality, however, Israel has just eliminated a potential threat nearby. In other words, regardless of who controls Syria in the future, Syria cannot quickly rebuild its military capabilities and obtain the means to counter Israel if it seeks to reclaim occupied territories.
The interview first appeared in the Farsi-language newspaper Ham Mihan.