Symposium: Will US-Israel relations survive the last year?
The US-Israel relationship has been largely marked by Washington’s consistent commitment to Israel’s security, beginning with the formal recognition of Israel in 1948 by President Harry S. Truman.
While the United States did not become Israel’s dominant arms supplier until after the 1967 war, it has been clear to all in the region since at least the Kennedy era that Washington was in Israel’s corner — despite strong Arab opposition, Israel’s wars on and with its neighbors, and its ongoing and often brutal struggle to deny the national aspirations of the Palestinian people in the name of ensuring its own security.
No matter the circumstances, from Tel Aviv’s secret nuclear weapons program in the early 1960s to the building of illegal settlements on the Golan Heights, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Washington has responded with more weapons, and more money for Israel — well over $300 billion in all, the most US aid provided to a single foreign country by far. It has ensured Israel a Qualitative Military Edge, requiring Washington to maintain Tel Aviv’s ability “to defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors.”
Despite this largesse, Israeli leaders have often defied US presidents and policy, raising questions about the balance in the relationship, or, as President Bill Clinton once indelicately put it after meeting with Israel’s longest-serving and current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, “Who’s the f……. Superpower here?”
More recently, Netanyahu’s cabinet has repeatedly rejected President Biden’s appeals to agree to ceasefire terms in Gaza. Netanyahu himself has boasted of his ability to resist or manipulate Washington in ways that further his aims, once asserting, “I know what America is. America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction. They won’t get in our way.”
After a full year of war, Israel has used a steady flow of American weapons to wreak revenge for the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas in which 1,138 Israelis were killed and about 200 more taken captive. To date, more than 41,000 Gazans, mostly civilians, have been killed, while at least 90 percent of Gaza’s 2.2 million population has been displaced, and the vast majority of its buildings and infrastructure destroyed.
With Israel now invading southern Lebanon and Washington’s nightmare scenario of a regional war breaking out, it would seem US-Israeli relations have reached a critical juncture.
Responsible Statecraft asked this group of scholars, journalists, and former diplomats if, for the first time in many decades, a real shift might be occurring. In other words, Has the last year of war permanently changed the US-Israel relationship? If so, how? If not, why?
Geoff Aronson, Andrew Bacevich, Daniel Bessner, Dan DePetris, Robert Hunter, Shireen Hunter, Daniel Levy, Rajan Menon, Paul Pillar, Annelle Sheline, Steve Simon, Barbara Slavin, Hadar Suskind, Stephen Walt, Sarah Leah Whitson, James Zogby
Geoff Aronson, Middle East Institute: The relationship between the US and Israel remains grounded in seminal US-Israeli understandings reached in the aftermath of the June 1967 war, according to which the US pledged to maintain Israel’s conventional military superiority over any combination of regional enemies. In return, Israel committed to maintain ambiguity about its nuclear weapons arsenal — undeclared and undeployed.
During this last year in particular, the Biden administration has remained true to this commitment to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) — a commitment enshrined in US law — notwithstanding unprecedented concerns about Israel’s (mis)use of US-supplied weapons.
The US insists that its support for Israel remains “ironclad.” “Make no mistake,” insists the president, “the United States is fully, fully supportive of Israel.” However, the unprecedented deployment of US forces to defend against Iranian missile attacks against Israel undermines Israel’s long-held contention at the heart of US-Israel strategic cooperation — that the conventional arsenal supplied by the US to Israel, or QME, enables it to “defend itself by itself.” The consequences of this critical Israeli dependence upon Washington’s direct military engagement remain to be seen.
Andy Bacevich, co-founder of the Quincy Institute, Boston University: No real change will occur in the US-Israeli relationship as long as President Biden remains in the White House. What has changed over the past year are popular American attitudes toward Israel. Israel’s “right to defend itself” cannot offer an adequate moral justification for the brutal punishment inflicted on the Palestinian people. Many Americans had grown accustomed to seeing the Arab-Israeli conflict as a contest between an innocent party and a guilty one. Events in Gaza and Lebanon have demolished that formulation once and for all.
Daniel Bessner, University of Washington: It’s far too early to tell whether Israel’s assault on Gaza has changed the US-Israel relationship. On one hand, there’s been unprecedented youth criticism of Israel and the “uncommitted” campaign indicates that in several important swing states unquestioning US support for Israel might become a significant liability. Nothing will really change until the current generation of leaders gives way to younger politicians who came of age in a different moment, something that isn’t exactly in the offing.
Dan DePetris, Defense Priorities: It’s quite clear that the last year of war hasn’t changed much of anything in the US-Israel relationship. US officials may be more vocal about their disagreements with Israeli policies and more willing to confront their Israeli counterparts rhetorically. But the actual policy doesn’t match the rhetoric. The US is still effectively enabling Israel to escalate even as it calls for regional de-escalation. It continues to sell large munitions and offensive weapons to Israel unconditionally while at the same time begging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to sign a ceasefire deal in Gaza and make peace in Lebanon. It remains virtually nonchalant, even as Israel, the junior partner in the relationship, pursues highly risky strategies that could eventually blowback on US forces in the Middle East. The US isn’t incapable of reforming the relationship — it’s unwilling.
Robert Hunter, former US Ambassador to NATO: America will continue rock-solid support for Israel’s security: It’s deep in US culture. Further, Israel’s perspective on the Middle East continues dominating the narrative in US society, politics, most think-tanks, and main- stream media. Thus without serious blow-back in Washington, Israel managed to kill the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, while thwarting US efforts to reduce tensions with Tehran; and President Biden is able to give Israel near-total support, in practice though not words, for its military actions in Gaza and Lebanon.
But the human toll of today’s multi-faceted conflict has raised questions about the terms of US support for Israel’s actions. There is erosion of initial sympathy for Israel’s response to Hamas’ horrendous slaughter last October 7. Some incalculable portion of younger Americans is less committed to virtual carte blanche for Israel’s leaders. Yet however US domestic politics develop, they — more than US interests — will shape America’s regional policies.
Shireen Hunter, former diplomat, Georgetown University: Following Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the war in Gaza has caused serious tensions in Israel’s relations with the United States. Israel’s indiscriminate bombing of Palestinians, the large number of dead (41,000-plus), massive destruction, and Washington’s inability to end the war have been the main causes of these tensions.
With Israeli attacks in recent days, minor clashes between Israel and Hezbollah expanded to major conflict and the killing of the Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, thus increasing the risk of Iran’s response. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the fundamentals of US-Israel relations will change, at least not soon. This is because no state, notably any key Arab state, has risked antagonizing the US by helping the Palestinians. In short, in terms of its relations with Arab and other states, the United States has not paid any political or other price for its unstinting support of Israel.
Daniel Levy, US/Middle East Project: The US support for Israel this past year (irrespective of its illegal actions in Gaza and elsewhere) represents more continuity than change. That manifests itself in the indispensable and constant conveyor belt of weapons supplies, the political-diplomatic cover and the alignment with, and repetition of, Israeli narratives — no matter how implausible, incredulous or extreme those are. But as the world around the US/Israel bubble reconfigures, the spillover looks different. The Trump innovation — unquestioningly embraced by Biden — of attempting to advance an Israel/allied Arab state regional hegemony, premised on the marginalization of Palestinian rights and embrace of Israel’s apartheid and displacement project, lies in tatters. It cannot be sustained even by willing regimes as Israel insists on alienating and enraging ever-broader swathes of Arab opinion. Nevertheless, expect the D.C. blob to double down on pushing this pitiful paradigm.
More intriguing perhaps is the realization of the deepening and staggering level of Israeli dependence on the US — precisely at a time when the relationship is contributing more than ever to the geopolitical weakening of America. As the Biden administration frantically runs cover for Israeli criminal actions, the cost to the US in political, reputational, legal and other arenas increases exponentially.
Rajan Menon, City College of New York, Columbia University: Has the US-Israeli relationship changed “permanently” following the attack by Hamas last October? No. True, the Biden administration provided unalloyed support — diplomatic, economic, and military — to Israel’s massive overreaction. But it’s long been an axiom in American politics that Israel must be backed unreservedly — not only during crises and wars, but even when it continues, as it has with particular vigor during the past few years, to expand settlements in the West Bank and allow “outposts” to proliferate there, to evict Palestinians from their land and allow settlers to attack them with impunity and even steal their livestock. To all this the current administration has turned a blind eye, but so did its predecessors. Nothing has changed and nothing will, no matter who is president. Even in our currently poisonous politics, bipartisan agreement prevails in the corridors of power on one point of policy: Israel must be supported unequivocally — always.
Paul Pillar, former CIA, Georgetown University: The principal sources of the extraordinary US-Israel relationship are embedded in domestic American politics and culture, and that is where to look for any signs the relationship may be changing. The influence of those sources — including a formidable lobby — remain strong. That influence has counteracted decades of Israeli conduct that has run counter to US strategic interests, and it will counteract much of the outrage over Israeli conduct during the past year.
The domestic politics of relations with Israel are evolving, however. In an increasing partisan split, automatic Republican Party support for Israel has accompanied Israel’s own lurch to the extreme right. Increasingly vocal opposition to Israel within the Democratic Party could lead a President Harris to adjust US policy once she is no longer the understudy to a self-proclaimed Zionist. A second Trump presidency would, like the first, give the Israel almost anything it wants.
Annelle Sheline, Quincy Institute: The most senior members of President Biden’s foreign policy team appear to be as tenaciously committed to maintaining full US support to the Israel as they were on October 7. This is the case, despite Israel repeatedly humiliating Biden and the US by disregarding every red line the president tried to establish. Biden’s response was to send more weapons and support. It seems that there is nothing Israel could do that would cause this administration to impose consequences or restrict the vast flow of American resources into Israel’s war machine, even as it threatens to drag the United States into war and potentially to destroy the Democrats’ chance of retaining control of the White House.
Yet the broader relationship has changed significantly. US support for Israel is no longer a bipartisan issue. The Israel lobby had to spend millions of dollars on two House primary races to defeat Black members who criticized Israel’s actions in Gaza, and were unable to primary Reps. Summer Lee (D-Pa.) and Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich). This caused many Americans to question the role of the Israel lobby in our politics, and whether such influence is in America’s interest. The next generation of American voters has demonstrated they will not support the US sending billions of our tax dollars to Israel that murders and starves entire populations.
Steve Simon, Quincy Institute, Dartmouth College: The past year might accelerate a trend already underway, namely the narrowing of Israel’s base of support here. Israel will retain strong Republican support while support among Democrats will contract. But it will not disappear, especially when Israel is under attack. Bipartisan support for US-Israel relations has been jettisoned by the Likud and Republican parties. For Likud’s purposes, the Republican Party is the horse to ride. And Republicans can weaponize support for Israel for political gain and outbid Democrats whenever an issue arises regarding US financial and military assistance. This is risky for Israel, but the Right appears relaxed and eager to boost Trump’s prospects despite his affinity for antisemites. Perhaps the Israeli right is willing to trade off the security of American Jews to get its way on the West Bank. Netanyahu thinks that liberal American Jews will soon disappear so he might assess the opportunity cost as acceptable.
Barbara Slavin, Stimson Center, George Washington University: I wish I could say that the past year has altered the US-Israel relationship but I’m afraid that the US is now even more embroiled in defending Israel against its many enemies. Without US arms shipments and intelligence, Israel would not have been able to pursue its retaliatory war against Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran with such impunity, killing tens of thousands of civilians and turning Gaza into a moonscape of rubble. There have been moments when Washington was able to pause regional escalation — as after the Iran-Israel exchanges in April. But that ability appears to have waned as we sit at the brink of a wider conflagration drawing in US forces along with Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese, Iraqis, Yemenis and Iranians, with no prospect of a cease-fire or return of Israeli captives in sight.
Hadar Suskind, Americans for Peace Now: The “special relationship” between the United States and Israel is not gone, but let’s just say, it’s not running for reelection either. The way Congress discusses and debates Israel and Palestine has changed more in the past year than in the 25 previous years. For the first time multiple members of Congress have, from the House and Senate floors, called for conditional cutting, or all together ending aid to Israel. When Netanyahu spoke to Congress, fully half of the Democratic caucus refused to be used as a prop in his campaign and skipped the speech. And while President Biden has largely maintained his historical views on Israel, the next generations of leaders did not, as Biden so often mentions, know Golda Meir. They do know Benjamin Netanyahu, and they don’t like him. If Israel wants to maintain a special relationship with the US, it needs to do so on the merits, and that remains to be seen.
Stephen Walt, Harvard University: At first glance, the “special relationship” between the United States and Israel seems stronger than ever. The Biden administration has given Israel a blank check, while Israel has ignored Washington’s ineffectual calls for restraint. Netanyahu got repeated ovations as he told a pack of lies to Congress, and universities have bowed to pressure from politicians and wealthy donors by cracking down on pro-Palestinian protests.
Yet October 7 and after still constitute a watershed in US-Israeli relations. Israel’s brutal attempts to destroy not just Hamas but thousands of innocent Palestinians have cost it the sympathy it received a year ago, and its violent campaigns on the West Bank, in Lebanon, and elsewhere have exposed its true character. The Israel lobby has been forced into the open, defending a genocide that has done lasting damage to America’s own image and interests. It won’t end overnight, but “special relationship” will never be the same.
Sarah Leah Whitson, Democracy in the Arab World Now: Israel’s year of atrocities in Gaza has permanently transformed the American public’s perceptions, not only of Israel as an abusive, apartheid state that the International Court of Justice said could be committing genocide in Gaza, but of Palestinians as a victimized, subjugated population, such that a majority of Americans now oppose military aid to Israel. However, the US government’s own backing for the Israel remains unconditional, despite the tremendous costs to America’s global standing. Our government has provided Israel with unprecedented military and political support for the war in Gaza, which has now dangerously expanded to military support for Israel’s fighting in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. This has brought into stark relief the gross misalignment of US policies towards Israel with public sentiments, and the outsized, malign role of pro-Israel organizations, including their influence on government officials to promote dangerous policies.
James Zogby, Arab American Institute: Israel’s year-long assault on Gaza hasn’t yet “permanently changed the US-Israel relationship.” It has, however, altered the political landscape shifting opinions, with key demographics — younger and non-white voters — moving in a pro-Palestinian direction.
As a result, pro-Israel groups and their congressional supporters have attempted to silence debate and arrest the growth of pro-Palestinian sentiment. State laws have been enacted penalizing individuals or groups that endorse sanctions on Israel and they’ve expanded the definition of antisemitism to include legitimate criticism of Israel. There’s been pressure from Republicans and donors to impose severe speech restrictions on university campuses and “dark money” groups are spending over $100 million to target the campaigns of members of Congress sympathetic towards Palestinians.
Given the reactions to Israel’s deplorable conduct and the repressive new “McCarthyite” measures against pro-Palestinian sentiment, the already deeply polarized debate over the US-Israel relationship is likely to become more intense in the future.
The article first appeared on Responsible
Statecraft.