Karimi: I, however, disagree with these experts and believe that the October 7 attack and the subsequent Gaza war are still within the framework of the existing “post-polar” order, and therefore, there haven’t been any significant changes in international relations.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar order, or the East-West bloc, the United States thought it could single-handedly manage the world, thus entering a unipolar world. However, it gradually became clear that managing the world in a unipolar manner was an illusion. The US itself realized this reality after the Persian Gulf War. In other words, the world is in a post-unipolar order where there is no single dominant power that can lead the world. In this order, various actors have entered the scene, and non-state actors have also become players, including anti-security groups like Daesh (ISIS).
The October 7 attack revealed the weakening of the positions of international powers and organizations. There are global powers and organizations, but their determining power has been weakened. The October 7 attack on Israel was not carried out by a state, but by a political-military movement, confirming that in the post-unipolar order, these non-state organizations also have determining power.
What are the characteristics of this post-unipolar order? Does it serve the interests of more countries, or do major powers still reap the most benefits?
One of the key features of the post-unipolar order is the geographical relocation of power. In other words, power or the exercise of power is no longer limited to a specific region, such as the West. Instead, multiple actors are playing roles in different parts of the world on various issues. Another characteristic of this era is that we no longer see long-term alliances or fixed strategic partners. Rather, we see issue-based alliances, where two countries or actors may be united on one issue while simultaneously disagreeing and competing on another. Furthermore, power has become more diffuse, extending beyond traditional hard power to include cultural, normative, and symbolic power. International actors are no longer limited to states and international organizations; new players have entered the scene.
Do you think this post-unipolar order will continue, or will the two major crises, the Ukraine and Gaza wars, change its trajectory?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar order, everyone was expecting a unipolar order centered on the United States, and the period from collapse to the establishment of the unipolar order was seen as a transitional phase. However, this transitional phase lasted a long time, and it ultimately became clear that the unipolar order was an illusion. It’s now unpredictable whether a new order is emerging or not. What is clear is that the world is at a critical juncture, and international organizations and major powers are experiencing significant inaction in the face of international crises. Even other powers or actors, such as the so-called emerging powers, are also inactive in the face of the two current crises, the Gaza war and the Ukraine war.
How do you see the future of the Gaza and Ukraine conflicts, particularly the Gaza war, which has now spilled over into Lebanon and caused significant damage?
I believe that both crises will be influenced by the upcoming US presidential elections. The next US administration, whether it’s Harris or Trump, will have to take a more serious approach to addressing these conflicts. While Harris and Trump may have different scenarios in mind, the US cannot avoid dealing with these crises, especially given its ongoing competition with China.
In such circumstances, how do you think the Islamic Republic of Iran and its new government can continue to play an effective role as a regional power and secure its interests?
In my opinion, in the current tense situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran should not fall into the trap of reacting to the initiatives or plans of its opponents or enemies. It seems that so far, Iran has behaved wisely and cautiously, and despite the escalation of tensions and even confrontations with Israel, it has not fallen into Netanyahu’s trap. Netanyahu wants to expand the scope of the war to gain more political and military support from the world, especially the West, and to cover up his own crimes in Gaza and Lebanon. Iran has responded to Israel twice, but it has not gotten entangled in a war with this regime. This is a wise policy.
At the same time, the Islamic Republic must also have its own initiatives and plans. Having initiative and implementing it requires active diplomacy and presence on the regional and global stage. The fact that the Iranian foreign minister traveled to Lebanon in the midst of the insecurity prevailing in the country, and then went to Syria, means being present on the scene. Abbas Araqchi’s presence in Lebanon showed that it is possible to take initiative and be active even in the most critical situations and at the center of the crisis.