Netanyahu’s anger at Pezeshkian’s interactive policy
By Abolghassem Delfi
Iran’s ex-envoy in European countries
During Iran’s recent presidential election, two distinct foreign policy visions were on offer. Masoud Pezeshkian championed engagement with the world, emphasizing the necessity of dialogue and diplomacy. This view resonated with the majority of voters, who simultaneously expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo in Iran’s foreign relations.
As is often the case, the path toward successful engagement faces significant challenges, both domestically and internationally. On the domestic front, hardliners who have historically opposed this approach remain a strong political force. Despite their electoral loss, hardliners retain their media outlets and influence, ensuring that they will continue to present obstacles to any engagement efforts.
Externally, the situation is equally complex. Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Israeli regime, hardliners in the US, and possibly some regional rivals, are disconcerted by the prominence of the voice of dialogue and engagement within Iran. Their strategy relies on maintaining tense relations between Tehran and its neighbors, as well as the broader international community, enabling them to forge coalitions against Iran and isolate the country. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, in Tehran, just as the new Iranian government was set to take office, fits into this narrative.
Undeniably, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is particularly dismayed by Pezeshkian’s victory as a reformist president espousing constructive engagement. Netanyahu’s efforts to thwart the Islamic Republic of Iran from achieving stability, both domestically and in its foreign relations, are evident. His trip to the US shortly after Pezeshkian’s win, aimed at rallying support for coalitions against Iran, and the subsequent attempt on Haniyeh’s life shortly after the new Iranian president was inaugurated, are illustrative of these disruptive tactics.
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