Persian Gulf Arab states, Red Sea tensions
Avoiding an unwanted war
By Hoda Yousefi
Middle East affairs expert
The Russia-Ukraine crisis has had a significant impact on global trade, particularly on the Asia-Europe rail transit route. This route, which previously accounted for a significant portion of trade between the two continents, has become less viable due to the conflict. As a result, the importance of the Red Sea as a maritime trade route has increased.
The Red Sea connects the Bab al-Mandab strait to the Suez Canal, a vital shipping lane that allows goods to be transported between Asia and Europe. Over 30% of the world’s maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, with an average of $400 million worth of cargo transported every hour.
The recent escalation of tensions between Israel and Hamas has also had an impact on the Red Sea. In response to Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, the Houthi rebels in Yemen launched drone and missile attacks on Israeli commercial and military vessels. This prompted the United States to form a coalition of countries, including the UK, France, Italy, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Seychelles, Australia, and Bahrain, to counter Houthi military attacks.
Many analysts believe that the US-led coalition is a pretext for Washington to increase its influence over the Red Sea. The region is strategically important and the US has long sought to assert its dominance there. The current tensions provide an opportunity for the US to do so under the guise of countering Houthi aggression.
The US and UK have already launched retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. However, these actions are likely to do little to resolve the underlying tensions in the region. Instead, they are likely to further destabilize the region and create a more dangerous environment for maritime trade.
Consequences of rising Red Sea insecurity
With the security of the Red Sea as a major international waterway compromised, shipping vessels are now forced to re-route around South Africa, a journey that takes at least two weeks longer. This has primarily affected Egypt’s revenue from the Suez Canal, with unofficial figures showing a 22% decrease in ship traffic in recent months.
In addition to the longer transit time, the insecurity in the Red Sea has also led to increased transportation risks and higher tariffs for goods. This is because ships are now exposed to greater risks of piracy, terrorism, and other maritime hazards. These increased costs are passed on to consumers, which contributes to inflation.
Even countries that have not been involved in the recent tensions are suffering from the current situation. For example, the cost of shipping a commercial vessel from China to Europe, which previously cost around $1,500, is now estimated at $4,000. This is a significant increase that will have a negative impact on businesses and consumers in both countries.
In the long run, continued insecurity in the Red Sea could even disrupt the global supply chain.
From a political perspective, the tensions in the Red Sea have the potential to exacerbate various layers of past and present conflicts.
Firstly, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis could escalate due to the Houthis’ perception of Riyadh as a close ally of Washington. This could lead to a renewed military confrontation between the two sides.
Secondly, the tensions between Iran and the US will also be amplified in this context. The Houthis are part of the “Axis of Resistance” and a regional ally of Tehran. On the other hand, Iran has taken a strong and explicit stance against Israel and the US, and any military action they may take in the region.
Stance of Persian Gulf Arab states
When the United States announced its intention to form a coalition against the Houthi Ansarullah of Yemen, none of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, except for Yemen, welcomed such an initiative. There are several reasons for the lack of support for the US in this incident and the general avoidance of any tension in the Red Sea by the Gulf Arab states.
Firstly, at the height of tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE with the Houthi Ansarullah, the United States did not provide the military support that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi expected. This issue particularly created resentment between these countries when the UAE requested military assistance after its facilities were attacked by the Houthis, but Washington did not respond adequately. Now, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in a position of retaliation against this US action and seem to be making the most of it.
Secondly, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have experienced the brunt of Houthi Ansarullah military attacks on vital targets within their territories and are seeking to adopt a position that will prevent such attacks from happening again with all their might. In its Vision 2030 document, Saudi Arabia seeks to become a regional commercial and economic hub. Under such circumstances, foreign military attacks are seen as potentially irreparable obstacles.
The UAE, which has also improved its position in the field of tourism in the region and the world in recent years, avoids any conflict that could jeopardize its national security. In addition to the issue of tourism, the United Arab Emirates hosted the UN Climate Change Conference last year and committed to making large investments in the field of renewable energy. Abu Dhabi seeks to attract more foreign investment, so it will not participate in events that make its country unsafe.
Abu Dhabi has also invested in important infrastructure in southern Yemen in order to achieve its commercial goals in the near future by increasing its influence in these areas. Increased tensions in the Red Sea will also threaten the UAE’s economic interests in Yemen.
Thirdly, Arab countries are forced to take some actions to manage public opinion; in the case of Palestine, public opinion in the Arab world is entirely against Israel. In this context, even countries like the UAE, which have normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, or countries like Saudi Arabia, which have a vision of improving relations with Tel Aviv, will not be able to participate in Israeli-American plans in order to manage public opinion.
Conclusion
After the outbreak of tensions in the Red Sea, countries such as Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait considered the continuation of the conflict in this region to be crisis-prone and called for a de-escalation of tensions. However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are more than other countries trying to reduce conflicts in the Red Sea because these two countries will not only be harmed by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but will also be exposed to military confrontation.