The Islamic Republic is not the Pahlavi regime
A glimpse into the aspects distinguishing the Islamic Republic from the Pahlavi monarchy on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran
The audience for this discussion is not necessarily limited to defenders of the Islamic Republic; in fact, it is particularly important for opponents of the Islamic Republic and even those who, according to their own claims, pursue ideas such as revolution, overthrow, coup, transformation, or any other fundamental change. This is because enmity towards a phenomenon without a proper understanding of it does not lead anywhere and may even be counterproductive. This article seeks to answer the question of why the Islamic Republic is different from the Pahlavi monarchy and why, just as revolutionaries managed to overthrow the Pahlavi regime, current radicals and overthrowers cannot overthrow the Islamic Republic.
Difference in the establishment of political systems
The rulers who come to power are not the same; the second Pahlavi followed the first Pahlavi to power, and the first Pahlavi regime was relatively entrenched itself. Therefore, even if we do not consider the second Pahlavi government as entrenched, it cannot be claimed that it came to power with the social support and will of the people. So, it is natural that if people have no involvement in the ascension of the ruler, they probably won’t have a clear preference or interest in it either. During the time of the second Pahlavi, people were merely observers, and since they lacked effective tools proportional to the political and social conditions of the time, they couldn’t interfere in who came to power. However, the Islamic Republic emerged from a social revolution; it was the people who brought this system into power with their own will. Therefore, this system, whether willingly or unwillingly, has its roots in common values with society and cannot be easily uprooted because it would require engaging with the entire society or at least the majority of the society that shares common values with the government, which is very challenging for opposition movements.
Difference in the politics of persuasion in dealing
with public opinion
The Islamic Republic system has tried from the beginning to communicate with the people in their language; hence, at least superficially, it has had the will to persuade public opinion. This is in contrast to the Pahlavi monarchy, where not only was there not much continuous communication with public opinion, and no dialogue was formed with society, but there was also no will to engage with the people. The personal nature of the Shah’s power and the aura of monarchy had led both the Shah and his entourage to see themselves as detached from the people, and fundamentally, they felt little reason to be accountable to the public opinion of society.
Difference in the presence of authoritative media
and the presentation of official narratives
During the Pahlavi era, modern forms of social communication were not extensively developed, and the concept of media did not exist. Consequently, people had limited understanding of events and relied solely on hearsay and rumors to stay informed about current affairs. Additionally, written media were very restricted and did not have widespread influence across all segments of society. As a result, the government was unable to provide an accurate narrative of events, and essentially, the concept of narrative did not exist; at best, there was dissemination of information and reporting of events. However, with the emergence of new media platforms and the expansion of social networks and written media, the Islamic Republic seized the opportunity to firstly inform the public about its nature and secondly to explain its achievements for the society.
Furthermore, the proliferation of new media space has rendered rumors and falsehoods less effective compared to the Pahlavi era, unable to significantly impact public opinion. Therefore, during the rule of the Islamic Republic, it is not possible to sway public opinion or incite against the government with misinformation and falsehoods.
Controlling official media and regulating the interaction of society with official media have led to the news authority being associated with state broadcasting, which can be considered as a winning card in the hands of the Islamic Republic. Whereas, the Pahlavi monarchy did not have such a widespread and influential news authority.
Difference in structural complexity
During the Pahlavi era, political and economic structures were not as extensive and complex, whereas in the Islamic Republic, structures are extensive and intricate. While this complexity poses challenges from various perspectives, ultimately it has made it difficult to easily overthrow or paralyze the Islamic Republic politically and economically. The complexity and expansiveness of political and economic structures have made calculations and planning by opposing governments very intricate, rendering them unable to significantly affect key points or threaten them.
The status of cultural, political, economic, and social institutions differs between the two periods of the Islamic Republic and the Pahlavi era. During the Pahlavi era, due to various reasons including the simplicity of societal structures, low population, and lack of bureaucratic organs and institutions, cultural, political, economic, and social institutions were not well-established, and society lacked structural cohesion. However, in the Islamic Republic, with the will for political and social development, it can be said that cultural, political, economic, and social institutions have relatively taken shape, and this has led to a significant distribution of power and authority among institutions rather than individuals. Therefore, during the Pahlavi era, activists and revolutionaries were only fighting against one person or at most a group of individuals who formed the court and aristocracy, and their work was simpler. But currently, if opponents want to fight against the Islamic Republic, they must contend with all existing institutions, or at least if they do not want to fight with institutions, they must recognize them officially and in a way engage in negotiations or exchanges with them, which is very difficult and almost impossible due to the complexity of institutions and the complexity of values and culture.
Difference in regional influence and the possibility of
regional consensus against Iran
The Islamic Republic plays a significant role in the region, which could be considered an anchor of stability. Consequently, achieving regional consensus against the Islamic Republic is challenging, making it difficult for neighboring countries to perceive Iran as a threat. Iran’s neighbors have realized that to maintain their own power, they are compelled to include Iran’s influence and power in their calculations. Even for safeguarding their own country’s situation, they tend not to align with foreign powers attempting to weaken the Islamic Republic. This factor has significantly contributed to the stability of the Islamic Republic and its stable position in the region. Naturally, it also aids in enhancing domestic stability. However, during the Pahlavi era, regional relations took a different shape. The Shah’s reliance on external powers in military matters on one hand, and the lack of effort to develop relations with neighbors on the other, made the Pahlavi government very vulnerable.
Difference in military and armament independence
The Islamic Republic enjoys complete independence in military power and armaments. Mohammad Reza Shah purchased the necessary armaments from foreigners, mainly from the United States and European countries, which resulted in him not having full operational control at times. However, from the outset of the Islamic Republic, policymakers sought to establish the basis of military power and armaments domestically. Therefore, it can be said that military independence and non-reliance on external sources for armaments have played a major role in Iran’s military and political independence. Additionally, the Shah’s dependence on America in military matters led to transparency in arms information. This means that America and European countries knew how much weaponry they sold to the Shah and were aware that, besides them, the Shah had no other weapons. But currently, because military information is within the country and there is no such transparency for foreign powers, they do not know the extent of Iran’s military capability. In fact, the Islamic Republic has based part of its foreign policy on the doctrine of ambiguity, and this itself has created grounds for speculation, fear, and lack of confidence of foreign governments in any military action.
Difference in the demographic structure of Iranian society
During the Pahlavi era, the country’s population was relatively low, which itself could be considered a threat to governance. However, in the current situation with the Islamic Republic in power, the population has gradually increased over time, leading to relative security. Naturally, the higher the population of a country, the more stable its economic and political structures will be. Because the complexity of mutual interests and their intertwining neutralizes threatening forces and, on the other hand, society based on internal contradictions somewhat finds cohesion and power, which, in total, not only is not destructive but also constructive. However, during the Pahlavi era, mutual interests in society were not so intertwined; rather, the concentration of interests on one side and power monopoly on the other made these interests one-sided and non-constructive.
Difference in the nature of political opposition
During the Pahlavi era, there was a strong and persuasive opposition that could establish communication with all segments of society. A clear example of this was the clergy and the university body, which could promote revolutionary values in the society and involve significant segments of society in their activities throughout the country. However, currently, the Islamic Republic does not have a strong and persuasive opposition. Consequently, a significant portion of the population cannot oppose the Islamic Republic even if they want to. This is because there is essentially no movement or personality that they can align with or use their statements. The lack of opposition itself is a clear reason for fears in parts of society about the future. Because the idea that there will be a worrying future after the Islamic Republic is present in the minds of a considerable portion of Iranians.
Difference in the level of experience and resilience
A wealth of experience and resilience contributes to the survival and endurance of the Islamic Republic; experience gained through various crises in different periods. This is while the previous government lacked significant experience in dealing with crises, which led to improper handling of popular protests and an inability to identify their causes. However, the numerous events that have occurred for the Islamic Republic over the decades, including political, economic, and even cultural crises, have somehow made the Islamic Republic effective and resilient. Naturally, this wealth of experience is generated and reproduced through various ideological and research centers and is subject to debate, leading to the formulation of newer, more efficient models. This is in contrast to the Pahlavi era, where such events did not occur, and the rulers were distant from centers of thought and paid no attention to them.
Difference in the distribution of power between
structural and non-structural sectors
Another significant difference between the Islamic Republic and the previous government is the diversity of power and the high level of its distribution among various structural and non-structural sectors. During the Pahlavi era, there was a concentration of power, and power was monopolized by the Shah and his associates. However, in the Islamic Republic, power is not institutionalized in one person; rather, it is distributed among a set of structures and institutions in various fields. When power is concentrated in one or a few individuals, it can easily be eliminated or confronted, but when power is distributed among various sectors of society and some aspects of power are structural and non-personal, it cannot be easily confronted or eliminated. Additionally, in Iran today, power, in the sense of influence, is not limited solely to structured institutions; rather, power diversity in non-structural institutions, especially social institutions, is observable.
Difference in the model of alternative for the political system
Until now, there is no agreed-upon alternative model for the post-Islamic Republic governance among the elites, and even opposition movements have not been able to propose a specific alternative in this regard. Even the discussions presented in foreign media indicate the level of differences between different models such as constitutional monarchy, authoritarianism, republicanism, or democracy. This is in contrast to the period of 1978 and even the years before that when the revolutionaries, led by Imam Khomeini, knew what model of government they were seeking. Imam Khomeini had presented the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih years before and advocated it in his explanatory speeches during the struggles leading to the victory of the revolution. Even after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Imam clearly knew what model of Islamic government was to be presented to the people. Historically, evidence shows that ambiguity and confusion among the revolutionaries of 1978 were minimal. However, currently, the opposition has somewhat fragmented intellectually to the extent that they sometimes clash over their own proposals.
Difference in the level of representation of society by political factions
In the Islamic Republic, almost all political currents that have emerged represent a significant portion of the society’s political tendencies. In other words, the political tastes of society, which are diverse and varied, have seen themselves represented in the government in various periods, and each of these tastes has had representatives in various governance matters. This is in contrast to the Pahlavi era, where essentially there was no such thing as republicanism and democracy, and the people did not consider the government as their representative. The rule of the Shah and the governance culture were such that there was no room for people’s participation in governance and holding various political positions. The emergence of various representatives as representatives of different tastes of society in the Islamic Republic has led to some kind of partisan conflict and political guarantee for the Islamic Republic. In the Pahlavi era, due to the existence of a dictatorial and single-party system, people had to accept what the Shah decided, and there was no room for political diversity.
Difference in the source and nature of
loyalty to the government
In the Islamic Republic, loyalty to the government is based on religious beliefs and values. Individuals who love or support the Islamic Republic have not aligned themselves with individuals but with values and ideals they consider spiritual and divine. It is clear that such loyalty is much stronger, to the extent that they are even willing to sacrifice their lives for it. This loyalty to the Islamic Republic is not only resilient but also not easily undermined. However, loyalty to a monarchical system is based on personal values, and such loyalties are often based on personal interests. Naturally, as long as these interests are secured, such loyalties exist; otherwise, they will disappear, and even with the weakening of interests, such loyalty will be weakened.